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Abstract 
Contemporary Political Opposition in Russia’s Competitive 
Authoritarian Regime  
Nicholas James Hemlock, M.A. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2019 
Supervisor:  Keith Livers 
Since Vladimir Putin came to power in 2000, the Russian political opposition has 
faced increasing levels of oppression by the state. As elections have become less 
democratic and the governing practices of Putin have become more authoritarian, Russia 
has come to resemble a competitive authoritarian regime type. Despite this continually 
shrinking political environment, opposition candidates still compete in elections and 
organize protests around the country. This paper provides an analysis of the Russian 
political opposition and assesses its electoral viability by drawing from existing research 
on opposition movements in competitive authoritarian regimes. Two models of 
opposition success, a state/party-based model and an opposition-based model, are applied 
to the Russian state, party of power, and Alexei Navalny’s 2018 presidential campaign. 
This paper finds that regardless of model used, the benchmarks for electoral success are 
not met by the Russian opposition as a result of historic international relations and 
contemporary action of Vladimir Putin and the Russian state. Additionally, this paper 
argues that the state/party-based model should be prioritized over the opposition-based 
vii 
model as a more comprehensive model for accurately explaining the political 
environment and characteristics of opposition movements in competitive authoritarian 
regimes. 
viii 
Table of Contents 
Chapter 1:  Introduction  .................................................................................................. 1 
Chapter 2:  Methodology  ................................................................................................ 5 
Chapter 3:  On the Electoral Success of Political Opposition in Competitive 
Authoritarian Regimes  .................................................................................................... 8 
Defining "Competitive Authoritarianism"   ............................................................. 8 
State/Party-Based Model   .................................................................................... 12 
Opposition-Based Model   .................................................................................... 15 
Chapter 4:  The State/Party-Based Model in Russia: 1991-2019  ................................... 21 
Linkages and Leverages   ...................................................................................... 24 
The 1990s and the Yeltsin Presidency  ...................................................... 24 
2000-Present Day: The Putin Era  ............................................................. 32 
Organizational Capacity of the State and Party of Power   .................................... 42 
Vladimir Putin and United Russia: Influence in the Russian Duma and 
Judiciary   ............................................................................................ 45 
Extension of Control: Cooptation and Repression of Russian Civil 
Society, NGOs, and Political Opposition  ............................................ 48 
Chapter 5:  The Opposition-Based Model in Alexei Navalny's 2018 Presidential 
Campaign  ..................................................................................................................... 56 
Campaign Ideology  ............................................................................................. 56 
Opposition Cohesion   .......................................................................................... 63 
Public Concerns and Campaign Platform   ............................................................ 67 
Campaign Engagement with Society   ................................................................... 70 
Societal Perceptions of Campaign Legitimacy   .................................................... 74 
Chapter 6:  Conclusion and Implications  ...................................................................... 77 
ix 
Bibliography.......................................  .......................................................................... 82 
1 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
On June 12, 2018, I stood among a crowd of spectators outside of the central 
stadium in Irkutsk, Russia as the national anthem rang through the air, signaling the 
beginning of the city’s Russia Day parade. The participants began their slow march up 
Lenin Street toward the city’s central square waving flags and singing songs. Among the 
members of this procession, the greatest presence was undoubtedly supporters of United 
Russia, the party of power in Russia that has strongly supported President Vladimir since 
its inception in the early 2000s. Both among the spectators and marchers alike, their T-
shirts, flyers, flags, banners, hats, and every possible article of clothing displayed the 
words “United Russia,” the pro-presidential political party, and their logo of a bear. This 
overwhelming political display stood in stark contrast to my experience several days later 
as I approached the entrance to the Irkutsk presidential campaign office of Alexei 
Navalny, one of Russia’s most prominent opposition politician. Inside the modest single-
roomed office, around a dozen people stood in various groups working on laptops, 
discussing stacks of papers spread across fold-out tables, and writing out a budget on an 
upright whiteboard. Although the election had already occurred and Putin had garnered 
73.06% of votes in the Irkutsk region, opposition activity continued in this eastern 
Siberian city.1 Despite the prominence of United Russia in the city, the large vote share 
for Putin, and intimidation tactics enacted against them, which included a severed pig’s 
1 Дмитрий Нисифоров и Любовь Арбатская (Dmitri Nisiforov and Lyuba Arbatskaya). “Итоги
выборов Президента РФ 2018 года в Иркутской области: победил Владимир Путин (Results of the 
2018 election of the President of the Russian Federation in Irkutsk oblast: Vladimir Putin was victorious),” 
Комсомольская Правда, March 19, 2018, https://www.irk.kp.ru/daily/26807.5/3843037/. 
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head affixed to the front door of the business-owner who rented out space for a Navalny 
rally in the city, the opposition still had the initiative to organize and plan for the future.2 
This experience in Irkutsk inspired further inquiry into this relationship between 
Russian political opposition and the difficult environment they contend with both on a 
day-to-day basis and in electoral campaigns. Rather than simply piecing together analysis 
of this dynamic through newspaper headlines and media reports, I wanted to better 
understand the prospects of opposition political success by exploring the characteristic of 
the opposition and the mechanisms that have created a system which greatly benefits 
Putin while simultaneously oppressing the opposition. This type of analysis is made more 
comprehensive by placing the Russian case into a larger context. In this paper, the 
Russian regime type of competitive authoritarianism is used as the unifying basis of 
comparison between Russia and other similar regimes in which the nature of the 
governing system greatly impacts the ability of political opposition to effectively operate.   
In order to assess the electoral viability of the Russian opposition, I gathered 
existing research on cases of opposition successes and failures in competitive 
authoritarian regimes. Within this research are two schools of thought for explaining 
what makes political opposition successful. The state/party-based model emphasizes the 
structural elements of the regime and state as the explanatory elements while the 
opposition-based model highlights the necessity of certain characteristics of the 
opposition itself. I applied the state/party-based model to the coordinating structural 
                                               
2 “Иркутске бизнесмену подбросили свиную голову. Он предоставил площадку для 
митинга Навального (A pig’s head was given to an Irkutsk businessman. He provided a space for a 
Navalny rally),” Meduza, October 31, 2017, https://meduza.io/news/2017/10/31/v-irkutske-biznesmenu-
podbrosili-svinuyu-golovu-on-predostavil-ploschadku-dlya-mitinga-navalnogo. 
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elements of the Russian regime and used the 2018 presidential campaign of Navalny as a 
case study for the opposition-based model. Based on comparing the Russian regime and 
this campaign with the benchmarks of these models, I argue that the Russian political 
opposition is not in a favorable position to unseat the incumbent power, regardless of 
which model is used. Furthermore, the state/party-based model, which prioritizes 
structural elements of the political environment as most important in determining 
electoral outcomes, is shown to be the preferred model for properly explaining the 
successes and failures of political opposition under this regime type. Low levels of 
linkages with Western democracies and resultant low leverage of Western democracies 
over Russia, coupled with high levels of state organizational capacity have bestowed the 
Putin regime with control over the legislature, judiciary, and security apparatus. This 
consolidation of power and the lack of international connections has left the Russian 
opposition with little room to maneuver and has rendered it unable to reach the 
benchmarks of the opposition-based model. The political environment as determined by 
the elements of the state/party-based model has effectively rendered the Russian political 
opposition inconsequential in elections. 
In the following section the methodology of this paper is further explained. A 
literature review of both the state/party-based model and the opposition-based model then 
establishes the necessary benchmarks of each model by discussing the existing work on 
opposition movements in competitive authoritarian regimes. The findings of the 
state/party-based model in the Russian context and of the opposition-based model in 
relation to the 2018 Navalny campaign are then presented. Finally, the conclusion 
4 
summarizes my findings and proposes areas in which future research on this topic is 
needed. 
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Chapter 2: Methodology 
This paper assesses the Russian opposition electoral viability based upon criteria 
cited in the literature on electorally successful opposition movements in competitive 
authoritarian regimes. The domestic Russian political environment and the 2018 
presidential campaign of Navalny, are used as a case study from which to search for these 
previously identified markers of successful opposition candidates in these regimes. These 
markers can be separated into two models which I have termed the state/party-based 
model and the opposition-based model.  
The state/party-based argument removes agency from the opposition movements 
themselves and places their opportunities for success on the environment in which they 
are acting as dictated by regime structure, the relations of the state with Western 
democracies and the organizational capacity of the state and ruling party. The linkages 
with democracies and the resultant leverage that comes with a greater amount of these 
links are the most important factors for explaining successful opposition movements in 
these regimes. Additionally, the organizational ability of the state and ruling party is a 
crucial element to this equation. This is a measure of the state’s ability to mobilize the 
population, win legislative seats to influence policy and the judiciary, and use coercive 
measures of the state security apparatus.  
The opposition-based argument focuses upon the characteristics of the opposition 
movement and candidates, including: campaign ideology, opposition cohesion, 
correlation of campaign platform with public concerns, campaign engagement with the 
6 
public and subsequent perceptions of campaign legitimacy on behalf of society. This 
model places the primacy for change outside of the structure of the state. 
The following review of writings on opposition movements in competitive 
authoritarian regimes more precisely describes the state/party and opposition-based 
models for successful opposition presidential electoral campaigns. Stevin Levitsky and 
Lucan Way originated the term “competitive authoritarianism” and thus the section 
begins with a thorough definition from which to place this regime type in relation to full 
democracy and full authoritarianism. Their state/party argument is then enunciated upon. 
Among the scholars reviewed in this paper, they are the only proponents of this model. 
The remaining writings posit various aspects of the opposition-based argument. 
With these two arguments in mind, the key aspects of each one are assessed in the 
Russian context. This is done in order to place the contemporary Russian opposition in 
the larger body of work on competitive authoritarianism. An overview of Navalny’s 2018 
presidential campaign provides the material from which to assess the opposition-based 
model. Looking at the Putin era beginning in 2000, the state/party-based model will be 
assessed through a discussion of state organizational capacity as well as the linkages and 
resultant leverage between the Russian government and democratic governments. 
Linkages dating back to 1991 in addition a discussion of contemporary linkages, or lack 
thereof, will be expanded upon. 
Additionally, through this analysis of the mechanisms of state capacity in the 
relation to Russian opposition during the Putin era, I show how the key aspects of the 
state/party model often dictate the ability of opposition to reach the markers of the 
7 
opposition-based argument. In other words, in order for opposition electoral success to 
occur in the opposition-based model, the key aspects for success in the state/party model 
must already be in place. Thus, in my discussion of the current linkages, leverage, and 
state organizational capacity, I will highlight moments in which low linkages, subsequent 
low leverage and a steep increase in state organizational capacity under Putin created a 
political environment in which the Russian opposition was unable to achieve the key 
indicators of success within the opposition-based model. 
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Chapter 3: On the Electoral Success of Political Opposition in 
Competitive Authoritarian Regimes 
Since the end of the Cold War, studies of democratization and economic growth 
in formerly communist countries have been extensive. There are success stories of 
countries that have emerged from communist rule, joined the European Union, and 
maintained high levels of democratic legitimacy. However, for many countries, more 
authoritarian forms of governance have taken hold and remained in place for extended 
periods of time. Russia falls within this latter category. Crackdowns on Russian political 
opposition have been well documented; however, analyses of interaction between the 
opposition and the state frequently document actions and subsequent reactions in the 
specific context of the time rather than contending with this relationship in a larger 
context of opposition movements under oppressive regimes. Instead of trying to 
understand the cycle of state action, opposition reaction, and electoral outcomes solely 
through analysis of events, positing this Russian case against an existing framework 
allows for clearer explanations of opposition success and failure. For the purposes of this 
paper, an overview of existing literature on opposition movements and elite support 
under competitive authoritarian regimes is necessary prior to assessing the possibility and 
prospects of a thriving, effective opposition movement and electorally successful 
opposition presidential candidates in Russia.  
DEFINING “COMPETITIVE AUTHORITARIANISM” 
In characterizing Russia during the majority of Putin’s rule since 2000, Samuel 
Greene states that “the state, while far from democratic, is equally far from totalitarian, 
 9 
and there is a significant public space in which civil society can operate.”3 From 
authoritarian to hybrid democracy to kleptocracy, the classifications of Putin’s Russian 
state are numerous. Present in many writings specifically on Russian political opposition 
is the term “competitive authoritarianism.”  
This term was originated by Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way. They argue that 
competitive authoritarianism is a new phenomenon of the post-Cold War period and thus 
warrants a separate designation outside of previously existing regime types.4 The field of 
terminology within which they place their new regime type is a spectrum between 
democracy and authoritarianism. At the most standard level of regime type, these types of 
regimes cannot simply be defined as democracies because their “serious electoral 
irregularities and/or civil-liberties violations do not meet procedural minimum standards 
of democracy.”5 Thus, subtypes of democracy are meant to account for different 
circumstances. These subtypes are numerous: electoral democracy, illiberal democracy, 
defective democracy, managed democracy, and quasi-democracy are just several terms 
employed for characterizing regime types. However, citing Juan Linz and Andreas 
Schedler, Levitsky and Way argue that many hybrid regimes violate democratic norms so 
severely that they should not be classified under the term “democracy” and instead 
should be classified with the adjective of “authoritarianism.”6 Occupying a sort of gray 
area on the continuum between democracy and full authoritarianism are the designations 
                                               
3 Samuel A. Greene, Moscow in Movement (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014), 92. 
4 Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, Competitive Authoritarianism (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), 14. 
5 Ibid, 14. 
6 Ibid, 15. 
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of hybrid regime, semi-democracy, or partially-free regimes, but Levitsky and Way argue 
that these regime types “reveal little about regimes other than what they are not,” in that 
they are not specific enough in their definitions.7 At the other end of the spectrum are 
subtypes of authoritarianism such as post-totalitarianism and bureaucratic 
authoritarianism which are inadequate in describing competitive authoritarian regimes 
because these regime types are noncompetitive. Levitsky and Way concede that electoral 
authoritarianism and semi-authoritarianism are two newer subtypes that are similar to 
competitive authoritarianism in that they define regimes which are nondemocratic with 
multiparty elections; however, these terms do not distinguish between competitive and 
hegemonic regimes.8 They argue that the specificity of the term “competitive 
authoritarianism” is warranted because competitiveness is an important regime 
characteristic that “affects the behavior and expectations of political actors” and thus in 
turn creates a “set of opportunities and constraints that do not exist in either democracies 
or other forms of authoritarian rule.”9 Additionally, it is an important term because 
competitive authoritarianism is widespread to the point where according to their 
definition, these regimes types outnumber democracies in Africa and the former Soviet 
Union.10 Levitsky and Way’s “competitive authoritarianism” is a regime type that adds 
necessary nuance to existing terminology and better captures the characteristics of a large 
number of regimes.  
                                               
7 Ibid, 15. 
8 Ibid, 16. 
9 Ibid, 16. 
10 Ibid, 16. 
 11 
The two authors define competitive authoritarian regimes as civilian regimes in 
which formal democratic institutions exist and are widely viewed as the primary means 
of gaining power, but in which incumbents’ abuse of the state institutions, security 
apparatus, and monetary resources places them at a significant advantage vis-a-vis their 
opponents.11 In these regimes, competition exists, but it is unfair and the “playing field” 
is heavily skewed in favor of incumbents. This playing field is the electoral environment 
in which the opposition and incumbent state compete. Levitsky and Way consider the 
playing field uneven when (1) state institutions are widely abused for partisan ends, (2) 
incumbents are systematically favored at the expense of the opposition, and (3) the 
opposition’s ability to organize and compete in elections is seriously handicapped.12 
Access to resources, media, and the legal infrastructure are the three most 
important aspects related to campaigning that are available to both incumbents and 
opposition. Incumbent control over any variety of these factors tilts the playing field in 
their favor. The degree to which these are co-opted by the state along with concurrent use 
of the coercive apparatus of the state are varying; thus, “competitive authoritarianism is a 
broad category that ranges from “soft,” near-democratic cases… to “hard,” or near-full 
authoritarian cases.”13 Levitsky and Way draw the authoritarian line in situations where 
multiparty elections are either nonexistent or noncompetitive. They deem elections 
noncompetitive in when “(1) major candidates are formally barred or effectively 
excluded on a regular basis; (2) repression or legal controls effectively prevent opposition 
                                               
11 Ibid, 5. 
12 Ibid, 10. 
13 Ibid, 34. 
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parties from running public campaigns; or (3) fraud is so massive that there is virtually no 
observable relationship between voter preferences and official electoral results.”14 It is by 
these standards that Russia’s governing regime is placed within the competitive 
authoritarian context. 
STATE/PARTY-BASED MODEL 
Levitsky and Way’s study of opposition regimes in competitive authoritarian 
regimes examined the trajectories of 35 regimes that were or became competitive 
authoritarian between 1990 and 1995.15 Their study is focused on the question of why 
some competitive authoritarian regimes democratized while others did not. The central 
argument of their study is that ties to western democratic government in addition to the 
strength of governing-party and state organizations are the main factors that determine 
whether competitive authoritarian regimes eventually democratize.16 These ties to 
western governments are described in terms of linkage and leverage.  
Linkage is defined as “the density of ties (economic, political, diplomatic, social, 
and organizational) and cross-border flows (of capital, goods and services, people, and 
information) among particular countries and the United States, the EU (and pre-2004 EU 
members), and Western-dominated multilateral institutions.”17 These links are important 
because they introduce outside influence. Levitsky and Way state that linkages create 
“domestic constituencies for adherence to regional and international norms,” which in 
                                               
14 Ibid, 7. 
15 Ibid, 4. 
16 Ibid, 5. 
17 Ibid, 43. 
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turn “blurs international and domestic politics, transforming international norms into 
domestic demands.”18 These demands are a form of leverage that have the potential to 
influence the domestic affairs of a nation.  
Leverage is defined as “a governments’ vulnerability to external democratizing 
pressure” and it “encompasses both (1) a regimes’ bargaining power vis-à-vis the West, 
or their ability to avoid Western action aimed at punishing abuse or encouraging political 
liberalization; and (2) the potential impact (in terms of economic health or security) of 
Western punitive action toward target states.”19 
 Regarding the strength of the state and party organizations: state coercive 
capacity is essential to competitive authoritarian stability and regimes outcomes while 
strong parties capable of mobilization and utilization of abundant monetary, state, and 
media resources are more likely to elect presidential and legislative candidates placing 
them in control of judicial appointments and future state policy.20 
Of these three factors, linkage which in turn creates the possibility for leverage, is 
the most important factor in determining whether a regime would lose in a presidential 
election to opposition and democratize. Of the thirty-five competitive authoritarian 
countries studied, those with high levels of linkage with the West were most likely to 
democratize and in cases where linkages were low, outcomes were reliant upon the 
organizational power of the incumbent.21 In countries with strong state and governing 
                                               
18 Ibid, 48. 
19 Ibid, 40. 
20 Ibid, 57, 63. 
21 Ibid, 5. 
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party structures, regimes remained stable and the incumbent remained in power, while 
states with underdeveloped state and governing party structures were unstable, though 
rarely democratized.22 
While this study largely places the onus of regime change on characteristics and 
actions of the state and governing party, they acknowledge that this theory cannot explain 
all cases of democratization from competitive authoritarian regimes. They state, “Regime 
outcomes are influenced by a variety of factors- including economic performance, the 
strength and strategies of opposition movements, leadership, and historical contingency- 
that lie outside of our theoretical framework. It is not surprising, therefore, that some of 
the regimes analyzed in this study follow trajectories not predicted by our theory.”23 
Additionally, they include two caveats relevant to Russia that are not adequately explored 
or elaborated upon in regard to the current situation in Russia. Though opposition forces 
may be relatively weak right now, civic and opposition forces may strengthen over time, 
thereby increasing the likelihood of endogenous democratization. Additionally, levels of 
organizational power also may change, often due to exogenous shocks such as war or 
economic crisis.24 To relate this to Russia, they state that although dominant in terms of 
size and resources, United Russia lacks critical sources of cohesion within the party 
structure to withstand these exogenous shocks. The sources of cohesion are a strong, 
guiding ideology and a past history of conflict within the nation in which the incumbent 
party came to power through ethnic or religious appeals. Putin did not face such a crisis 
                                               
22 Ibid, 5. 
23 Ibid, 24. 
24 Ibid. 351. 
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in the 2000s, but United Russia’s heavy reliance on patronage may leave it vulnerable in 
the future.25 This briefly mentioned loophole emphasizes the cohesion of the incumbent 
party as a potential tipping point during times of crisis which could be exploited by 
opposition movements as the organizational capacity of the state and party rapidly 
decreases. 
OPPOSITION-BASED MODEL 
Expanding upon effective areas of opposition action, Daniela Donno states that 
competitive authoritarian regimes are accurately characterized as potentially unstable in 
that democratization is contingent on whether domestic and international actors choose to 
pressure the regime.26 Unlike Levitsky and Way, Donno places the impetus for change 
less on the structure of the regime and more in the hands of the opposition movements 
either enabled through domestic or international support. Her findings only hold for 
competitive authoritarian regimes. The gradual tightening of control and further isolation 
from democratic leverage can result in a political system Donno calls hegemonic 
authoritarianism. In hegemonic authoritarian regimes, the incumbent or ruling party 
enjoys overwhelming electoral dominance (conventionally understood as winning more 
than 70 or 75% of the vote or seat share).27 In these regimes the same pressures that can 
potentially destabilize competitive authoritarian regimes are ineffective.28 Under these 
                                               
25 Ibid, 201. 
26 Daniela Donno, “Elections and Democratization in Authoritarian Regimes,” American Journal 
of Political Science 57, Issue 3 (2013): 703–716, doi:10.1111/ajps.12013, 714. 
27 Ibid, 703. 
28 Ibid, 704.  
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guidelines, Russia once again falls into the competitive authoritarian classification. In the 
2012 Russian presidential election, Putin won 63.60% of the total votes as a member of 
the United Russia party.29  
Moving still further from structural responsibility for regime change, Sergei 
Guriev and Daniel Treisman put the agency for change in the hands of a nation’s citizens. 
Perceptions of legitimacy and recognition of authority among the public is crucial for the 
continued survival of a regime. The authors argue that these leaders survive “not because 
of their use of force or ideology, but because they convince the public—rightly or 
wrongly—that they are competent.” 30 These leaders accomplish this through maintaining 
acceptable living standards, state propaganda, and coopting government elites to support 
the incumbent leader. In this argument, the state is constantly vying for control because it 
recognizes that agency is ultimately in the hands of the public and that their buy-in or 
tolerance of the regime determines the longevity and relevance of the regime.  
When describing the competitive authoritarian model, Guriev and Treisman point 
out that these regimes simulate democracy, enjoy popularity after eliminating rivals, and 
maintain power through “performance legitimacy,” a perceived competence at securing 
prosperity and defending the nation against external threats.31 This perceived confidence 
                                               
29 Центральная Избирательная Комиссия Российской Федерации (Central Election 
Commission of the Russian Federation). “Выборы Президента Российской Федерации (Election of the 
President of the Russian Federation),” March 7, 2012, 
http://www.vybory.izbirkom.ru/region/region/izbirkom?action=show&root=1&tvd=100100031793509&vr
n=100100031793505&region=0&global=1&sub_region=0&prver=0&pronetvd=null&vibid=10010003179
3509&type=226. 
30 Daniel Treisman and Sergei Guriev. “How Modern Dictators Survive: Cooptation, Censorship, 
Propaganda, and Repression,” SSRN Electronic Journal, (2015), doi:10.2139/ssrn.2571905, 1. 
31 Ibid, 2. 
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leads to actual support, as is the case in Russia. However, in times of protest as these 
perceptions become more negative and critical, often as the result of an economic or 
security crisis, then co-optation, censorship, and propaganda are increased. However, all 
these actions require money, which must come from taxing the citizens, depressing their 
living standards, and indirectly lowering their estimate of regime competence.32 This 
ensuing cycle results in the loss of regime legitimacy because the public no longer 
associates the regime with economic and security benefits that once garnered support 
despite the non-democratic environment.  
Similar to Guriev and Treisman, Marc Morje Howard and Philip G. Roessler 
again place agency for regime change in the hands of citizens, specifically in the 
collective action of the opposition. They point out the inherently contradictory nature of 
competitive authoritarianism as a central weakness of the incumbent leader and the 
system as a whole. Legitimate procedures like elections are undermined by illegitimate 
practices such as vote rigging, violent disenfranchisement, and media bias. The resulting 
tension raises frustration with the incumbent regime and provides further incentive for the 
opposition to act.33 For these opposition movements, the end goal is an electoral victory. 
In instances when the competitive authoritarian regime is removed in favor of a more 
liberal and democratic policies, a liberalizing electoral outcome (LEO) is said to have 
                                               
32 Ibid, 3. 
33 Marc Howard and Philip Roessler. “Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in Competitive 
Authoritarian Regimes,” American Journal of Political Science, 50, (2006): 365–381, doi:10.1111/j.1540-
5907.2006.00189.x, 369. 
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occurred.34 In their analysis, the strongest explanatory variable for a LEO is the 
opposition’s formation of a coalition. Even with a presidential incumbent running for 
reelection in a country that has not experienced substantial political liberalization over the 
past five years (and other variables kept at their mean), the probability of a liberalizing 
electoral outcome increases by more than 80% as the opposition is able to overcome its 
inherent divisions and build a broad-based coalition.35 
Citing Howard and Roessler’s study, Michael Wahman provides a useful 
explanation for how these coalitions form and when they are most successful in 
maintaining cohesiveness. A broad oppositional coalition would be expected if two 
conditions are met: (i) There has to be a significant policy difference between the 
incumbent party/parties and the opposition; (ii) The opposition is unipolar.36 An 
exception is noted, as coalitions are occasionally also formed in non-ideological party 
systems where they are created for purely opportunistic reasons assuming a larger free-
for-all following the removal of a long-seated incumbent (Wahman 655). Wahman’s 
analysis lends importance to opposition ideology and policy agenda. Instances in which 
the opposition has formulated a policy agenda distinct from that of the incumbent 
government are more likely to produce pre-electoral coalitions and as Howard and 
                                               
34 Ibid, 365. 
35 Ibid, 375-376. 
36 Michael Wahman. “Offices and policies – Why do oppositional parties form pre-electoral 
coalitions in competitive authoritarian regimes?,” Electoral Studies, 30, (2011): 642-657, 
doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2011.05.009, 645. 
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Roessler found, opposition coalitions are a strong indicator for successful opposition 
electoral outcomes.37  
Valerie J. Bunce and Sharon L. Wolchik offer a slight rebuke to Howard, 
Roessler, and Wahman’s findings on opposition coalitions while still allowing for a great 
degree of opposition agency and room for maneuvering. In their analysis of competitive 
authoritarian regimes, they divided the circumstances of successful opposition outcomes 
from the unsuccessful attempts. The key issue posed by the two sets of elections 
(opposition success vs. failure) was less a matter of whether regimes were ready to depart 
than of whether the opposition was ready to defeat them.38 The strategy of the opposition 
in relation to voters is cited as the most important indicator of electoral success. They 
highlight a fundamental truth for any election: the opposition in any regime ultimately 
cannot win an election without the proper number of votes and the support of the public. 
The opposition must convince the public to vote, vote for them, and, if necessary, defend 
their choices in the streets.39 Engagement with the public is the key to winning and 
creating an optimistic sense of belief in an otherwise oppressive setting that encourages 
apathy is important for garnering support.40  
 Creative and innovative strategy is important, though any positive engagement 
with society is ultimately beneficial for opposition. Bunce and Wolchik’s broad swath of 
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strategies include: forging a unified opposition that puts forward a single candidate; the 
mounting of ambitious, nationwide campaigns by the opposition; collecting and 
distributing public opinion data that candidates can then use to frame their appeals; 
orchestrating energetic voter registration and turnout drives; maintaining pressures on the 
regime to reform election commissions; forming youth movements that support political 
change through elections.41 More so than previous explanations of opposition success, the 
results of this study leave the door open for innovation and new ways of civil engagement 
that either have not been previously attempted and therefore are less likely to be 
suppressed by the incumbent government. 
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Chapter 4. The State/Party-Based Model in Russia: 1991-2019 
With the key components of each model established, the following section will 
present an assessment of each criterion of the state/party-based model in the Russian 
context from the collapse of the Soviet Union to present day. Linkage, leverage, and state 
organizational capacity are observable at varying levels in this time period; however, 
there is a general trend among each criterion rather than constant fluctuation. In this 
nearly thirty-year span, already low levels of linkages and leverage decreased while state 
organizational capacity greatly increased. 
Low levels of linkage and leverage were already present as remnants of relations 
from the Soviet period.  Russia’s nuclear power status and continued regional influence 
afforded it what some scholars have deemed “black-knight” status- an actor which can 
counter other outside influence in the domestic affairs of neighboring nations in which it 
has a strategic interest. These factors had the effect of minimalizing democracy 
promotion while maximizing efforts relating to security in the region and the world as 
Russia remained a strategic concern for both the EU, NATO, and the U.S. 
From the 2000s onward, these linkages and leverage only decreased. The 
Ukrainian Orange Revolution in 2005 marked a distinct change in how Russia viewed the 
West, namely the United States and the EU. A distinct anti-Westernism emerged, 
wrought with suspicion over the true motives of Western policies and a believe that 
ultimate goal of these policies was the to destabilize Russia and subvert the Putin regime. 
On several significant occasions, namely the 2008 Russian-Georgian War and the 
annexation of Crimea coupled with military incursion into eastern Ukraine, Russia 
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reasserted its influence and challenged what it perceived as Western incursion through 
militaristic means in areas it regards as its sphere of influence. In addition to these hard 
power incursions, Russia has exerted influence in the domestic election of both its 
neighboring countries and around the world. 
In more recent years, an international tit for tat relationship has emerged between 
Russia and the democracies of the EU and U.S. The removal of Russia from the G8, a 
ban on Russian Olympic competition, the nullifying of long-standing international 
treaties, and sanctions have been the Western response to the Russian activity in Ukraine 
and a general rejection of international norms on behalf of Russia. During this period of 
animosity with the West, Russia-China relations have reached a high point. What few 
linkages and leverage existed at the beginning of Putin’s time in office have only been 
further reduced as a result of these circumstances. 
Concurrent to this reduction of linkages and leverage, a significant increase in the 
organizational capacity of the Russian state and ruling party occurred. In the early 2000s, 
administrative changes and consolidation of political parties with their respective 
constituencies took place and concentrated power in United Russia. This party loyal to 
Putin filled the legislature and by exploiting the structure of the Russian judicial system 
was able to influence court appointments. If the ability to enact policy by decree was not 
power enough for the executive, this strong party loyal to the incumbent ensured that 
Putin faced nearly no obstacles when passing any legislation he wanted.  
During Putin’s first term, from 2000-2004, this political consolidation was 
coupled with actions that signaled the beginning of the end for Russian independent 
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media. Television stations and print publications were either taken over or shut down. 
The media landscape became dominated by state-owned or state-influenced outlets while 
independent sources dwindled over time as they faced increased pressure from authorities 
and a series of highly publicized murders targeting journalists.  
A series of events at the beginning of Putin’s second term began to reframe 
notions of what civil society stood for, while marginalizing NGOs and any Western-
backed aid or democracy-promoting organization. Following the Ukrainian Orange 
Revolution in 2004-2005, Putin undertook what Robert Hovarth has termed a 
“preventative counter-revolution.” This campaign repressed civil society and opposition 
through coercive actions, laws, and the creation of a parallel self-proclaimed “patriotic” 
civil society under the auspices of stomping out dangerous Western incursions into 
Russia’s domestic affairs. 
This consolidation of power and “preventative counter-revolution” greatly 
increased the organizational capacity of the state and ruling party. With this new normal 
established, additional measures were taken during Putin’s third term in office between 
2012 and 2018. Most notably, in 2012 a series of amendments to laws regulating NGOs 
were passed and enacted, thereby requiring NGOs receiving foreign funding or engaging 
in vaguely defined “political activity” to register as “foreign agents.” Three years later a 
similar law was passed which not only targeted NGOs deemed to be “undesirable”, but 
also the individuals and organizations interacting with these “undesirable” groups.  
These findings relating to the criteria of the state/party-based system do not paint 
a promising picture when comparing them to Levitsky and Way’s cases of successful 
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opposition under a competitive authoritarian regime. An already low level of linkages 
from the Soviet period decreased over time as did already low levels of Western leverage 
while state organizational capacity drastically rose. Based on these findings, the Russian 
regime can be classified as “stable” according to Levitsky and Way, meaning that the 
chances for a democratic transition as a result of an opposition electoral victory are 
minimal. 
LINKAGES AND LEVERAGE 
The 1990s and the Yeltsin Presidency 
With the Soviet collapse and the fall of the Iron Curtain across Eastern Europe, a 
period of transition occurred. Authoritarian regimes of the past gave way to new 
democracies as Western Europe and the United States aided these new governments 
through engagement in the areas of politics, economics, security, and democracy 
promotion. The Russian Federation occupied a unique position in this dynamic. As the 
foundational republic of the Soviet Union, Russia was still a formidable country for 
Western democracies to contend with in respect to its regional influence, size, and 
military capability, particularly its nuclear stockpile. 
Accordingly, while there was Western support for Yeltsin and a new Western-
facing Russia, there was still a prevailing view of Russia as a top security concern, 
particularly within the U.S. and the administrations of George H.W. Bush and Bill 
Clinton. In a 1995 Carnegie Corporation report on preventing deadly conflict and 
addressing threats to world peace, a “hostile, expansionist Russia” was listed as the first 
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priority.42 More specifically, Russia was seen as a threat to the security of Europe and the 
United States because its “still very substantial nuclear, scientific, and military prowess” 
in addition to great uncertainty regarding Russia’s domestic politics and the future desires 
of the country.43 Following the 1995 Duma elections, the two largest contingents filling 
the Russian legislature were those of Gennady Zyuganov’s Communist Party of the 
Russian Federation and Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s Liberal Democratic Party of Russia. 
Zhirinovsky’s saber-rattling reverberates in the concerns of the Carnegie report which 
states: “Today, the Russian state (insofar as it continues to exist) appears perched on the 
precipice of capture by ultranationalist, anti-Semitic, neo-imperialist forces.”44 The fear 
of Zyuganov winning the 1996 presidential election was real, as was the uncertainty of 
what would follow such an event and what the election of a communist to the Russian 
presidency would mean for both the future of Russia and its relations with western 
democracies.  
As a result of this significant concern and a desire to prevent a backslide into 
authoritarianism during this time of democratic transition, numerous aid packages were 
prepared for Russia and other newly independent states (NIS) by the U.S. government, 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank. The network through which 
this money traveled was both complicated and at the time, a newly created system. 
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During the Soviet period, there were a minimal number of American NGOs working with 
Russian officials and following the Soviet collapse, the experience of working in a post-
communist country was an entirely new one.45 Just as American aid organizations faced a 
new working environment in this post-communist space, in 1992 Russians were only just 
beginning to form civic advocacy organizations, independent trade unions, competitive 
political parties, and business associations.46 Throughout the 1990s, NGOs arose focusing 
on all aspects of society. While it may appear that these aid packages and the 
proliferation of these organizations are related to one another, a closer look at the nature 
of the funds being sent to Russia and the method of disbursing money shows that much of 
the assistance to Russia came with strings attached and that the primary focus of this aid 
was not democracy promotion.  
Any aid packages approved by the U.S. Congress were coordinated by the U.S. 
State Department and then distributed by the U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID). USAID did not send money directly to the Russian government or any 
particular region, but rather they contracted USAID-funded projects through a network of 
private American companies and nonprofit organizations to provide “technical 
assistance,” knowledge, and expertise to Russian counterparts in an attempt to assist in 
implementing reforms.47 This process of working through American contractors was a 
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requirement of the funding and as such, it was up to these contractors to effectively work 
with Russian organizations.48 Problems quickly arose with this system and in many cases, 
ultimately hindered effective use of funds.  
There were no USAID offices in Moscow during the Soviet-era and they did not 
open a full office in Russian capital until 1993.Within USAID and among the 
organizations it contracted projects out to, there were few Russian speakers. Among this 
same group, there were also very few experts who had worked in post-communist 
countries transforming command systems into market economies.49 These problems were 
exacerbated by pressures on USAID from the U.S. Congress to quickly get into the field 
and assist Russia’s transition. Training in these areas was foregone as fast result were 
demanded in order to show that funding these projects was a politically successful 
measure.50 The need to provide conclusive results that funding was producing desire 
outcomes was also a constant pressure on USAID. As a result, USAID contractors often 
invented “quantitative” measurements of success relating to programs they were working 
with, going so far as to hire writers to conjure up success stories across Russia stemming 
from the USAID-funded projects.51 Thus, while the U.S. provided aid packages to Russia 
in the early 1990s, the means by which it was disbursed were highly flawed with 
questionable rates of efficacy as a result of the enormous task at hand, new working 
environments, and outside political pressure on USAID. 
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Aside from the USAID structure, the nature of these aid packages themselves had 
a negative effect on democracy promotion because in all cases of congressional approval 
for economic assistance, projects addressing the security concerns of the U.S. in relation 
to Russia took highest priority. In 1994 a $2.4 billion aid package was approved by 
Congress for the newly-independent states of the former Soviet Union. This amount was 
passed through Congress under the auspices of being a one-time only spike and for the 
remainder of the decade, funding for Russian reform continually decreased.52 Of this $2.4 
billion, $1.6 million was approved for Russia with the following breakdown accounting 
for which areas received what amount of funding: $194 million for grant food assistance, 
$700 million for credit assistance to purchase American food products, $148.4 million for 
private sector development, and $48 million for democratic assistance.53 From 1992 to 
1998, a total of $5.45 billion was sent to Russia and of this amount, $130 million or 2.3 
percent was allocated to programs involved in democratic reforms in Russia.54  
When addressing the nature of American aid to Russia, U.S. officials often broke 
down their assistance strategy into three components: democracy promotion, market 
assistance, and cooperative threat reduction.55 As was previously shown, instead of 
focusing on political reforms and promotion of organizations to aid building democratic 
institutions in Russia, many of the funds sent to Russia through aid packages were 
focused on economic reform that had mediocre rates of success. Of these three 
                                               
52 Ibid, 93. 
53 Ibid, 111. 
54 Ibid, 114. 
55 Ibid, 107. 
 29 
components present in official rhetoric of the time, cooperative threat reduction also 
garnered vastly greater allotment of funds in comparison to democratic assistance. The 
Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program began in 1992 and was primarily 
concerned with engaging Russia as a potential security threat to be neutralized. At the 
heart of the program was the effort to remove weapons of mass destruction and ensure 
proper decommissioning of nuclear weapons from the former Soviet republics. This 
program was referred to as “defense by other means” and considered by many in the 
Clinton administration and within the Defense Department to be the most important aid 
program to Russia.56 As such, it received a large amount of funding from the U.S., 
roughly half of the amount devoted to economic assistance and six times the amount 
reserved for democratic assistance; however, unlike aid packages which varied in 
amount, spending on CTR remained around a constant $400 million per year throughout 
the 1990s.57 This spending reflects the post-Cold War hesitance to invite Russia into the 
community of Western democracies without first addressing the many security concerns 
of these nations. In these instances of U.S. assistance, political reform took a backseat to 
economic reform and the neutralization of potential threats to the U.S. and its European 
allies.   
The support of international economic organizations such as the IMF and World 
Bank was also conditional and of questionable efficacy. The World Bank issued Russia 
ten loans over two years amounting to $2 billion, but their targeted recipients- the 
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agriculture and mining industries, were slow to reform and marred by corruption as 
massive state-owned corporations of the Soviet period were privatized.58 IMF loans were 
similarly viewed as ineffective and misguided, particularly because of the conditionality 
attached, their need to eventually be paid back and because IMF loans were seen “as a 
reward for progress on the economic reform agenda, not a facilitator of progress on the 
reform agenda.”59  
Considering the programs of the U.S., IMF, and World Bank, the post-Cold War 
assistance to Russia in the 1990s dealt primarily with economic and security concerns, 
not political reform aimed at democratic promotion. While the total amount of aid may 
have been high, with structures in place to facilitate reform, the percentage of money 
allocated to democratic reforms was minimal compared to other areas and aside from the 
CTR program, the distribution of aid packages approved by Congressional budgets was 
done through a hurried, unprepared, and ill-equipped system consisting of USAID and 
American contractors. The low level of linkages during the Soviet period was increased 
as these programs were in place, but their temporary nature and lack of concretely 
definable results meant that the rise was neither substantial nor permanent.  
The significance of not establishing USAID offices in Russia until 1993 and of 
barely addressing the political and institutional aspect of reform can be inferred through 
the words of Gennady Burbulis, a close-advisor to Yeltsin throughout the 1990s. In 1996, 
he stated: “The paradox of Russia in the 1990s is that the constitution of 1993 was written 
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essentially without any alternatives; it was written in the personal interests of Yeltsin and, 
like him, it contains both democratic and authoritarian tendencies…. And so if he is a 
democrat, it is situational. With Yeltsin there is always the possibility of ruling with an 
authoritarian hand, of skipping the difficult processes of analysis, of bargaining for 
consensus.”60  
This is an implication of Yeltsin as much as it is of the Russian constitution and 
democratic institutions within the country at the time. The institutional design of the 
presidency, as set out in the 1993 constitution, placed a great deal of power in the 
executive during a period when Yeltsin faced substantial opposition in the legislature. 
These transitions and new institutions were imposed by the executive rather than being 
negotiated. Both August 1991 and October 1993 were resolved through armed conflict 
rather than through negotiations and it is argued that because of this, the opportunities for 
democratic ideas to enter into debates over institutional design were greatly limited.61  
In conclusion, linkages and leverage between Russia and western democracies, 
already low from the Soviet-era, remained low during the 1990s. Aid structures targeted 
US strategic concerns and economic reform; however, both the economic as well as the 
social aspect of assistance was temporary and ill-implemented. Democracy promotion 
and political reforms were minimal during this time while what little assistance provided 
was seemingly too little, too late to effectively have lasting effects on the Russian 
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political structures which were democratic in appearance, but already exhibiting non-
democratic flaws in practice.  
2000-Present Day: The Putin Era 
This is the foundation Putin inherited in 2000 when he entered his first term as 
President. By 2004, Russia was exhibiting the behavior of what scholars have termed a 
“black-knight.” This type of nation acts as a “counter-hegemonic power whose economic, 
military, and/or diplomatic support helps blunt the impact of U.S. or EU democratizing 
pressure.”62 Russian interference in the 2004 Ukrainian presidential election was the first 
well-publicized example of this cross-border countering of Western pressure. In this case, 
the Russian-back incumbent President of Ukraine, Viktor Kuchma, had aligned Viktor 
Yanukovych as his successor. As the election approached, circumstances began to favor 
the candidate of the democratic opposition, Viktor Yushchenko. Following an initial 
runoff result deeming Yanukovych the winner, the Orange Revolution occurred, a 
recount commenced and Yushchenko was declared president. Four years after entering 
office, Putin’s actions show a different side to the idea of linkage and leverage that has 
become increasingly relevant when discussing Russia. Rather than considering linkage 
and leverage in relation to western democracies, this “black-knight” status has also 
highlighted countries’ connections to Russia and the resultant potential for Russian 
influence in their domestic affairs. This rejection of international norms and violation of 
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sovereignty has put Russia at odds with the western democracies of the international 
community.  
The most egregious acts of Russian influence against democratizing and 
Westernizing pressure in neighboring countries involved internationally-condemned 
military campaigns meant to destabilize the countries to the point of halting their 
progression. The attacks against Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 marked a turning 
point in Russian relations with western democracies. The ensuing E.U. and U.S. 
sanctions against Russia further soured relations and provoked additional Russian 
measures against its neighbors and the sanctioning nations. Linkages at the level of 
international political and economic cooperation decreased during this period and 
leverage remained low.  
The 2008 Russia-Georgia War occurred at a time when Georgian president 
Mikhail Saakashvili was orienting Georgia toward a future in the European economic and 
security space as opposed to a partnership with Russia. Prior to the conflict Georgia 
entered into a NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP), the first step toward joining the 
mutual defense organization, and in the months before the war, the U.S. took part in joint 
military exercises in Georgia. Then in August 2008, Russian troops entered Georgia 
under the auspices of protecting Russian citizens in the two republics of South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia. With the Georgian army quickly defeated, Russian troops remained in 
these two republics which then proclaimed their independence from Georgia, an act 
recognized as legitimate by Russia. These actions by Russia created a still-frozen conflict 
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with these self-proclaimed independent republics and halted Georgia’s MAP progress in 
addition to sidelining a trade agreement with the EU. 
Most recently, Russian actions in Ukraine showed an increased willingness to 
engage in the affairs of its neighboring countries and in turn, garnered a more severe 
response from the US and EU. In 2013, the Russian-supported President of Ukraine, 
Viktor Yanukovych, pulled out of plans to sign a political association and trade 
agreement with the EU. This plan was seen as an initial step toward Ukraine entering an 
association agreement with the EU, the first step in the EU membership process. Instead, 
Yanukovych signed a trade agreement with Russia. This sudden withdrawal from the EU 
plan sparked protests in Kyiv which eventually led to the ousting of Yanukovych and the 
election of pro-Western President Petro Poroshenko. Shortly thereafter, unmarked troops, 
later revealed to be Russian special forces, appeared in Crimea and took over government 
offices, eventually drafting a referendum which led to Crimea joining Russia. This 
referendum and annexation were universally condemned and deemed illegal by the US 
and EU. Simultaneous to these actions in Crimea, war broke out in eastern Ukraine as 
Russian troops surreptitiously entered the country and Russian-backed separatists 
proclaimed the independence of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. These proclamations 
were again not recognized by western democracies. Just as in post-2008 Georgia, Russian 
hostility toward its western-leaning neighboring countries, in what it deems its “sphere of 
influence,” have had destabilizing effects on Ukraine as large swaths of eastern Ukraine 
remain in a frozen conflict that routinely flares up into deadly skirmishes. 
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More so than any other actions since Soviet times, Russian aggression against 
Ukraine and the annexation of its territory have driven relations between Russia and the 
EU and US to a low point. The most significant response of the US and EU has come in 
the form of sanctions. From 2012-2018, the US imposed more than 60 rounds of 
sanctions on Russian individuals, organizations, and government agencies.63 The 2017 
Countering American Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) codified the series 
of US sanctions against Ukraine. As of December 2018, 36 companies and organizations 
with relations to the Russian defense sector have been sanctioned in addition to 48 
entities and individuals with relations to the Russian intelligence sector.64 These numbers 
increased further in March 2019, when the US, EU, and Canada issued joint sanctions 
against Russia for the November 2018 attack on Ukrainian naval vessels.65 
These sanctions against Russia stemming from aggression against Ukraine are but 
a portion of the sanctions leveled against Russia in the past seven years. The 2012 
Magnitsky Act “bars individuals (from Russia and elsewhere) who are complicit 
in human rights abuses and corruption from traveling to the West, owning assets in the 
West and using the financial [infrastructure[ of the West.”66 The law was named in 
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commemoration of Sergei Magnitsky, a tax-accountant who died in prison following his 
investigation into high-level Russian officials committing tax fraud. Eighteen Russians 
tied to his imprisonment and death were immediately placed on this list of barred persons 
following the act’s passage in late 2012.67 In early 2019, the EU began developing 
legislation of the same name with the same purpose, to punish state and non-state actors 
for human rights violations.68 This naming is significant because it once again unifies the 
EU and US against the actions of Russia through the retaliatory mechanism of sanctions. 
The Magnitsky Act specifically has drawn a significant response from the Kremlin. A 
direct, immediate response from Russia was the ban of US adoption of foreign children 
and additional responses have followed. Russian opposition activist, Vladimir Kara-
Murza has stated that he believes that Putin views the Magnitsky Act as one of the 
biggest threats to his regime.69 Russian animosity toward both the case around Magnitsky 
and the Magnitsky Act has had domestic repercussions as well. A libel case was brought 
against Alexei Navalny in 2016 by an investigator at the Russian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs Pavel Karpov.70 The entire case centered around Navalny posting a documentary 
to social media that linked Karpov to the death of Magnitsky.  
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CAATSA and the Magnitsky Act have been two of the more consequential 
actions taken in response to Russian acts of aggression. The effects of these US-led 
efforts have can be seen in Russia’s response which focused on reducing diplomatic ties 
with the US. In response to CAATSA, Putin reduced the number of American diplomatic 
and technical personnel in Russia from 1,200 to a maximum of 455 people, the same 
number of Russians working in similar positions within the United States.71 Mirroring the 
Obama administration’s repossession of two Russian diplomatic properties in 
Washington D.C., Russia coupled this diplomatic expulsion with the seizing of two 
American diplomatic properties in Moscow.72 Diplomatic ties further strained in 2018 
following the poisoning of a former Russian spy (i.e., Sergei Skripal’) in England when 
the US closed the Russian consulate in Seattle and removed dozens of additional Russian 
diplomats.73 Altogether, thirty nations expelled a total of 153 Russian diplomats in 
response to the Russian poisoning in England.74 Russia reciprocated in turn to these US 
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expulsions by sending another 60 American diplomats back to the US and closing the US 
consulate in St. Petersburg.75  
This back and forth between Russia and the international community has not only 
been limited to reductions of diplomats. Russia’s relationship to international 
organizations and treaties has also changed in the past five years. In all of these instances, 
the linkages between Russia and western democracies- both political and economic, have 
been reduced. In early 2019, the US pulled out of the longstanding Intermediate-Range 
Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty of the Cold War-era citing multiple Russian violations and 
nonadherence to the treaty.76 The following day Russia also withdrew from the treaty. 
Russia participation in and recognition of international institutions has also decreased. In 
2015, Russia’s legislature passed a law giving Russia’s Constitutional Court “the power 
to review international human rights rulings to decide if they violate the Russian 
Constitution and are therefore “non-executable.””77 This ruling essentially allows Russia 
to disregard rulings of international courts which is precisely what it did in July 2015 
when the Russian Constitutional Court found a judgement of the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) to be a violation of the Russian Constitution.78 This rejection of 
an international organization was the choice of Russia. The 2014 expulsion of Russia 
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from the G8 was not their choice and signified one of the more substantial steps taken 
against Russia for their interference in the domestic affairs of neighboring nations. 
In addition to the numerous rounds of previously-mentioned sanctions, the 
removal of Russia from the G8 was in response to the Russian annexation of Crimea. The 
Hague Declaration was issued in March 2014 by the remaining G7 nations. Following a 
recitation of Russian illegal action in Ukraine, the declaration states: “This Group came 
together because of shared beliefs and shared responsibilities. Russia’s actions in recent 
weeks are not consistent with them.”79 These ideas were further echoed the following 
year at the groups 2015 meeting in Germany when US President Barack Obama said that 
one of the themes of that year’s summit would be “the opposition of Russian aggression 
in Ukraine.”80 In 2018 Putin responded to enquiries about Russia potentially rejoining the 
group. He stated that it was not Russia’s choice to leave the G8 in the first place and that 
regardless of membership in that organization, Russia was still a key part of the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO) which was overtaking the G7 in purchasing power 
parity.81 The SCO nations include China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, 
Uzbekistan, India, and Pakistan. Putin’s emphasis on this economic link with Asian 
nations is a part of a bigger general trend that has been termed Russia’s “turn to the east.”  
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Spurn by geographic proximity, international condemnation of actions in Ukraine, 
and a mutual distrust of Western efforts to interfere in their non-democratic regimes, 
Russia has increasingly engaged with China. In a 2013 state of the nation address Putin 
declared: “The resources of the state and private business must be devoted to 
development and the achievement of strategic goals. For example, the renaissance of 
Siberia and the Far East. That is our national priority for the whole 21st century.”82 This 
strategic emphasis on Asiatic Russia has meant a necessary engagement with bordering 
China. As a result of this domestic development strategy and a worsening of relations 
with its Western neighbors, Russia-China linkages have increased.  
Of the new linkages between Russia and China, no other area has seen more 
activity than that of economic cooperation. The Eastern Economic Forum began in 2015 
as “a summit for developing political, economic, and cultural ties between Russia and 
Asia Pacific.”83 China attended the EEF for the first time in 2018 as the Chinese 
ambassador to Russia stated, “At present, China-Russia relations are at their best in 
history…”84 Following a year in which bilateral trade between the two nations increased 
25 percent, the presidents of the two nations agreed to increase Chinese investment in the 
Russian Far East in addition to a commitment to reduce their use of the U.S. dollar in 
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bilateral trade deals.85 This 2018 EEF in Vladivostok was held concurrently with Vostok 
2018, the largest Russian military exercise since the Soviet era. Though Russia and China 
had been holding join naval drill since 2012, this was China’s first time participating in 
this large-scale exercise which in 2018 “focused on enhancing coordination and 
knowledge between the two countries’ militaries.”86 This increase in relations has been 
the product of mutual benefit in the areas of economic and military cooperation as much 
as a mutually held position relative to the U.S. The most recent 2017 U.S. National 
Security Strategy and the Department of Defense’s Cyber Strategy identified both China 
and Russia as strategic competitors “attempting to erode American security and 
prosperity.”87 When regarding linkages and leverage in the context of 2019 Russia, the 
state of relations with the EU, U.S., and other western democracies is such that as 
linkages have decreased with these areas, they have necessarily increased elsewhere and 
in this case China has been the target of significant Russian interest.  
The story of Russia since 1991 was been one of a first gradual then rapid 
delinking from the U.S. and EU. Low levels of linkages and leverage were carryovers 
from Soviet period and have only decreased, particularly during the Putin era. A relative 
lack of outside democracy promotion in the 1990s coupled with Russian institutional 
design allowing for a strong executive led to a strong decoupling of Russian interests 
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with those of western democracies. The decrease in economic and especially political 
links with these nations has had the result of keeping foreign democratizing pressures 
from taking hold domestically within Russia. In the following section, I will show how a 
large increase in state and ruling party organizational capacity enabled Putin to suppress 
civil society, non-governmental organizations and opposition political parties, all of 
which promoted and advocated for democratic values in Russia.   
ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY OF THE STATE AND PARTY OF POWER 
During the Putin era, from 2000 onward, the organizational capacity of the state 
and ruling party greatly increased. Efforts to consolidate political power began early 
during his tenure and have continued throughout his four terms as the Russian president. 
In Putin’s first term, administrative districts were redrawn, political parties were merged, 
many independent media outlets fell under government control, and Putin’s party United 
Russia took hold of the majority of seats in the Duma. This majority legislative control 
which has continued through Putin’s fourth term has allowed for the passage of laws 
which favor their continued hold on power. This favorable position in the legislature has 
also granted more influence for Putin’s party of power in the Russian judiciary. 
Simultaneous to this taking over of legislative and judicial control, a crusade against civil 
society, NGOs, and political opposition commenced. In early 2005, less than a year after 
the beginning of Putin’s second term, the Orange Revolution occurred in Ukraine 
following the Georgian Rose Revolution of 2003. A series of measures were 
subsequently enacted in Russia which Robert Hovarth has termed “Putin’s Preventative 
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Counter Revolution.” Through media control, legislative as well as physical repression, 
and the mobilization of state resources, Russian civil society and oppositional political 
parties were greatly limited in their ability to exist and operate. Most recently, this control 
over potential opposition sources of power and influence was further expanded by the 
2012 “Foreign Agents” law which required all NGOs receiving foreign funding to 
register as “foreign agents.” As the Western linkages and leverage have decreased during 
Putin’s rule, a simultaneous expansion of state and ruling party power has occurred. This 
combination of factors has created an unforgiving environment for political opposition in 
Russia.  
The measures taken by Putin during the 2000s sought to expand the range of 
power of his executive branch and the party of power, United Russia. This process began 
in early 2000 when Russia’s administrative districts were redrawn. A presidential decree 
compiled Russia’s 89 provinces into seven large federal districts to be administered by a 
Kremlin representative meant to oversee implementation of federal law across the 
country and to “organize cooperation or settle disputes between Moscow and the 
regions.”88 Additional changes were made regarding regional oversight in late 2004 
following the Beslan school siege in the North Caucasus. Under the auspices of 
increasing security following terrorist attacks across Russia, a presidential decree 
eliminated regional governor elections in favor of a new system in which the Kremlin 
appointed these leaders. The security in thirteen of Russia’s oblasts was also taken under 
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Kremlin control following the formation of groups led by senior interior ministry officers 
charged with supervising “all anti-terrorism forces, federal security services, defence and 
emergency and the interior ministry” within these oblasts.89 These administrative reforms 
were part of a larger effort to reinforce the security of the country by preventative 
measures. In order to accomplish this, the security forces were also granted more 
financial and material resources during this time period in the early 2000s.90 
As these administrative and security reforms shortened the distance between the 
state and the people, a simultaneous reorganizing of the country’s political parties further 
concentrated power in the pro-presidential party of power. In early 2001, the Fatherland-
All Russia political party, one of the largest opposition blocs in the Russian Duma, was 
merged with Putin’s party Unity. This new grouping was to be renamed later that year: 
United Russia, the dominant political party in Russia since this merger occurred. At the 
time, this merger gave Unity the largest share of the Duma and while Putin regarded the 
union as a “constructive step on the way to reforming Russia’s political system,” Sergei 
Ivanenko of the liberal Yabloko party stated, “Unity has devoured Fatherland…This new 
party will be dominated by Unity. The Kremlin can view this as a victory.”91 With two 
years remaining until Duma elections and the largest centrist bloc absorbed, the 
remaining party landscape consisted of conservative parties with platforms similar to 
United Russia’s as well as more liberal opposition parties like Yabloko. Russia’s first 
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Duma elections under Putin occurred in 2003 and the results of this contest, along with 
every subsequent election, show a continued majority control by United Russia. 
Vladimir Putin and United Russia: Influence in the Russian Duma and Judiciary 
A brief look back at the 1999 Duma elections results is a helpful contrast with 
later elections in order to see a narrowing of the political field and the emergence of the 
pro-presidential United Russia in the legislature. The top three vote-getters were the 
Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) (24.29%), Unity (23.32%), and 
Fatherland- All Russia (13.33%).92 The vote threshold to enter the Duma in this election 
was 5% of the total vote. Six parties cleared this threshold while twenty-one were below 
it. By 2003, United Russia had surpassed the CPRF with a vote share of 37.57% to the 
CPRF’s 12.61% as only four parties of the twenty-one passed the 5% threshold.93 
The 2007 Duma election saw implementation of several changes in electoral law 
by the Duma. For this election, voting blocs were prohibited and only parties which 
completed the arduous registration process could compete in the election. Most 
significantly, the electoral threshold a party needed to obtain in order to gain seats in the 
Duma was raised from 5% to 7%, the minimum voter turnout requirement for the election 
to be valid was eliminated, and the “against all” voting option was similarly done away 
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with.94 With parties previously consolidated and a majority hold by United Russia in the 
Duma, the raising of the minimum electoral threshold to 7% coupled with the prohibition 
of voting blocs imposed massive barriers for parties competing against United Russia. 
Parties of similar ideologies could not band together in an effort in an effort to 
consolidate votes and they also had to surpass an already difficult voter threshold. The 
“against all” vote had previously been seen as a protest vote, a rejection of the 
establishment parties, and used by voters who were more skeptical of the government’s 
ability to adhere to democratic standards.95 This vote was often utilized in elections and 
the 4.70% “against all” received in the 2003 Duma elections was higher than seventeen 
of the twenty one parties competing for seats. With these new measures in place, the 
minimum voter turnout requirement of 25% of eligible voters was eliminated to ensure 
that voters who may have been disenfranchised by these government actions would not 
have an effect on the election by not participating. After all was said and done, only four 
parties passed the 7% threshold and United Russia produced its single largest turnout 
ever in a Duma election, garnering 64.30% of the votes with the next closest party 
collecting only 11.57%.96 
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This trend of United Russia victory in a field of weak competitors continued 
through the 2011 and 2016 Duma elections. A 49.31% vote share was improved to 
54.20% from 2011 to 2016 as four parties passed the minimum threshold in each 
election.97 98 The next closest party, the CPRF, trailed significantly in each election: 
30.12% in 2011 and 40.86% in 2016. 
Through decrees by Putin to initially strengthen their position vis-à-vis other 
parties and the implementation of new electoral laws once in the legislative majority, 
United Russia was able to establish a firm grasp on the legislature of Russia by Putin’s 
second term. In addition to his already strong executive abilities as dictated by the 1993 
Russian Constitution, this loyal pro-presidential party gave Putin massive control over 
policy-making and the electoral processes of the Russia.  
This concentration of power also extended to the judicial branch as a product of 
the system of judicial appointments which relies heavily upon the Russian legislature and 
the President. According to the International Commission of Jurists’ country profile of 
Russia, “Judges of the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court are appointed by the 
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Council of the Federation (upper chamber of the Parliament), upon the proposals of the 
President while judges of other federal courts are appointed by the President of the 
Russian Federation, according to rules fixed by federal law.”99 The profile concludes 
“that elements of law and practice in the appointment process do not adequately 
safeguard the independence and the quality of the judiciary.”100 Thus emerges a self-
reinforcing machine in which judges determining the constitutionality of decrees and 
laws are appointed and confirmed by the those issuing said decrees and laws. As a result 
of legislative victories and a presidential tenure spanning nearly two decades, Putin and 
United Russia have been able to dominate policy-making and greatly influence the 
judicial system in the process.  
Extension of Control: The Cooptation and Repression of Russian Civil Society, 
NGOs, and Political Opposition 
Georgia’s 2003 Rose Revolution and Ukraine’s 2005 Orange Revolution signaled 
the beginning of significant changes in not only these two nations, but Russia as well. 
Both changes of power toppled pro-Russian leaders and brought pro-Western leaders to 
power. These peaceful revolutions were spurned by mass protests advocating for more 
democratic practices, less corruption, a more Western-oriented future for their nations, 
and the reduction of Russian influence in their domestic affairs. The incoming pro-
Western Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili stated: “If Georgia can resolve its 
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problems, that will change the situation in the post-Soviet space…It is important to create 
a precedent for the entire region…”101 Following the Orange Revolution, the since 
murdered Russian opposition politician Boris Nemtsov echoed this sentiment of looking 
abroad for examples and inspiration to resolve problems in Russia: “It’s a positive kind of 
envy, because the Ukrainian people have shown that they have a sense of their dignity, 
that they have their pride, and that they will fight for their freedom and for the truth. And 
this can teach us a lot. You know, in the past, people in Kiev used to look to Moscow. 
And now an awful lot of Muscovites, and not only Muscovites, Russians, in general, will 
probably be looking to Kyiv to see how people are fighting for their rights, fighting for 
truth and freedom.”102 
This came at a time in Russia when mass protests were occurring throughout the 
country as a result of dissatisfaction with social welfare reforms. Building upon the 
momentum of these protests, youth activists and political figures began to widen the 
scope of their protest just as they had in Ukraine and Georgia from social reforms to 
larger political demands such as the resignation of the government.103 Putin’s reaction to 
these events was a multi-pronged campaign to ensure that the events of Ukraine and 
Georgia would not be repeated in Russia.  
The three aspects of this larger project were concerned with ideology, repression, 
and mobilization. The ideological element was based on the idea that “Russia’s 
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sovereignty was menaced by Western efforts to foment a revolution and impose ‘external 
rule.’”104 These neighboring revolutions were portrayed by the Russian state as examples 
of Western, primarily American, imperialism meant to expand NATO and the EU into 
both areas of Russian influence and Russia itself, all with the intention of infiltrating 
Russia and bending it to the will of the West.105 With this narrative of invasive Western 
incursion established as a threat, the protests at the time and the organizations as well as 
politicians involved in them were demonized by the state as products of these Western 
efforts to influence Russia. This framing was used as a justification for repression of 
protests, civil society, opposition politicians, and Russian NGOs through the coercive use 
of the security apparatus as well as the mobilization of new non-state structures meant to 
co-opt and counter anti-government protests.106 
The campaign against civil society by the ruling regime entailed the creation of 
new legislation and a separate “patriotic civil society,” as well as an increased use of 
security forces. NGOs became subject to a more arduous registration process in addition 
to a massive amount of required oversight by the state into the nature of their activities 
and the sources of their funding.107 Security officials began openly advocating for 
legislation which expanded state control over NGOs under the auspices of protecting 
Russia from foreign infiltration.108 At the same time as this tightening of control over 
NGOs was occurring, the regime was creating new, loyal NGOs as a part of a “patriotic 
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civil society” that was aligned with the regime. While independent NGOs struggled to 
meet the many new reporting requirements and steep fines for non-compliance, state 
grants were being extended to these newly created NGOs 
One of the most influential creations of the Putin regime during this time period 
was the youth organization Nashi. This state-sponsored group was the single greatest 
mobilization tool for the regime. In addition to acting as a non-state method of coercion 
against the demonstrations of the true Russian opposition, Nashi used the tactics of the 
key revolutionary youth movements in Georgia and Ukraine such as creating unique 
symbols and slogans, the promotion of a strong Russia free from foreign interference, as 
well as the sanctioning of mass gatherings to divert support for true opposition 
organizations into this larger, better-funded, and dogmatic organization.109 Nashi had a 
significant presence throughout Russia and acted in equal parts as a pressure-valve for 
discontent by diverting support from opposition groups through patriotic gesturing as 
well as a sort of counter-opposition security force of the regime used to disrupt the 
protests and activities of the true opposition. 
Most significant for electoral outcomes, this period greatly constricted the 
capacity of opposition parties to exist and operate. Both the systemic opposition parties 
represented in the Duma and non-systemic groups without representation in the 
government, were simultaneously targeted. The previously discussed new election laws 
increased the barriers to entry into the legislature through raising the minimum vote 
threshold to 7%, the prohibition of political blocs, and an increase in requirements for 
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party registration. Party leaders like Alexei Kasyanov were target by the state with 
kompromat mean to delegitimize their authority and weaken both the standing of their 
parties and the opposition as a whole.110 In many cases, ousted leaders and opposition 
figures of smaller parties were replaced by regime functionaries, creating a “managed 
opposition,” “whose function was to divert protest into loyal channels and to occupy 
political space that might otherwise be lost to the anti-Kremlin opposition.”111 Just as 
parallel, pro-regime structures were created in civil society environment, the electoral 
space in Russia became co-opted by Putin’s regime through these managed parties and 
the implementation of laws created by the party of power. 
The largest source of non-systemic opposition protest was centered around 
Drugaya Rossiya, a coalition formed by the drastically different opposition leaders Garry 
Kasparov, Eduard Limonov, and Mikhail Kasyanov. Their protests directly addressed the 
chipping away of civil liberties and the constriction of the political environment. 
Drugaya Rossiya was depicted in the largely state-controlled media as a fascist and anti-
Russian group, a labeling which justified the intense state response to their actions.112 
The Interior Ministry’s Regional Directorate for the Struggle Against Organized Crime 
(RUBOP), the FSB, and OMON special police units were used to infiltrate the non-
systemic opposition and detain activists in both preventative roundups under fraudulent 
pretexts and in the public space during protests.113 The simultaneous threat from the state 
                                               
110 Ibid, 163. 
111 Ibid, 145. 
112 Ibid, 172. 
113 Ibid, 172.  
 53 
security apparatus and the non-state yet state-sanctioned actors like Nashi greatly 
hindered the ability of these groups to continue functioning.  
All of these changes to Russia’s political environment occurred in the first eight 
years of Putin’s tenure as president. These measures greatly increased the organizational 
capacity of the state and party of power. A strong executive branch as established by the 
1993 constitution set the stage for initial decrees that could aid in consolidating power for 
a single party of power. With a legislative majority quickly amassed, the laws of the 
country could be adjusted to the whims of Putin and control over the process of judicial 
appointment meant that the constitutionality of new laws was less likely to be challenged. 
In the months and years following the Ukrainian Orange Revolution, Putin used this 
consolidated power along with the instruments of the state security apparatus to extend 
control over the country’s civil society while also severely limiting the ability of 
opposition parties to exist.  
In recent years, the state’s control over the NGO sector in Russia has been further 
extended through a series of laws that required NGOs and media outlets receiving foreign 
funding to register with the Ministry of Justice as “foreign agents.” In 2012, the first 
“foreign agents” law targeting NGOs was passed and was seen as an attempt to demonize 
the remaining non-state-aligned NGOs. Those receiving foreign funding were to be 
labeled “foreign agents” regardless of the type of activity the group engaged in, but 
instead based upon “involvement in the logistical or financial organization of, or 
participation in, ‘political acts’ aimed at influencing the decision making of public 
authorities, changing public policy, or influencing public opinion with respect to 
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government policy.”114 Going past the point of simply labeling NGOs as “foreign 
agents,” a 2015 law directed toward foreign NGOs authorized the government to “shut 
down or ban the activities of foreign or international NGOs found to undermine state 
security, national defense or the constitutional order.”115 The law also penalized Russian 
citizens and organizations “working for, receiving funds from, participating in the 
activities of, or distributing information from undesirable groups.”116 Most recently in 
2017, a new expansive law allowed for Russian authorities to block online content 
deemed “undesirable” while also expanding the parameters of the 2012 law to any 
organization receiving outside funding or based outside of Russia, meaning that media 
outlets became subjected to these registration and labeling requirement.117 The “othering” 
of NGOs and civil society that began following the Orange Revolution has become the 
norm in Russia.  
By 2008, the end of Putin’s second presidential term, the Russian political 
environment had been transformed. The laws, decrees, and tactics used greatly increased 
the organizational capacity of the state and party of power. A strong executive branch as 
established by the 1993 constitution set the stage for initial decrees that could aid in 
consolidating power for a single party of power. With a legislative majority quickly 
amassed, the laws of the country could be adjusted to the whims of Putin and control over 
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the process of judicial appointment meant that the constitutionality of new laws was less 
likely to be challenged. In the months and years following the Ukrainian Orange 
Revolution, Putin used this consolidated power along with the instruments of the state 
security apparatus to extend control over the country’s civil society while also severely 
limiting the ability of opposition parties to exist. Laws passed in Putin’s third term 
continued this narrative of protecting Russia from Western incursion established in the 
early 2000s. The result of this nineteen-year effort by Putin is a greatly uneven playing 
field between the incumbent regime and political opposition. Any opposition politician 
hoping to contend in a presidential election must first navigate this gauntlet of laws, 
regulation, monitoring, and coercion prior to even running a campaign. It is an 
inhospitable environment created by a lack of democratic influence via linkages and 
leverage as well as the structural elements of the regime, namely the high organizational 
capacity of the incumbent government and party of power. 
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Chapter 5. The Opposition-Based Model in Alexei Navalny’s 2018 
Presidential Campaign 
The following chapter considers the opposition-based model in the context of 
Navalny’s 2018 presidential campaign. First, I will assess the campaign ideology and its 
stance in relation to the regime ideology. Second, the issue of opposition cohesion will be 
addressed. Third, correlation between campaign aims and promises with concerns of the 
Russian people will be discussed. I will then explore the degree of campaign engagement 
with the public. Finally, subsequent perceptions of campaign legitimacy on behalf of the 
society will be addressed. Among the criteria of this model, the only concrete benchmark 
met is the presence of a distinct, countering opposition ideology in relation to the 
incumbent regime. Aside from this single area of correlation between theory and reality, 
the remaining benchmarks were woefully unmet. During the 2018 presidential election, 
the opposition was fragmented, the policies of Navalny did not adequately address the 
main concerns of Russian citizens, his campaign’s engagement with the population was 
limited and those who did know about his candidacy more often than not viewed him 
overwhelmingly negatively. Similar to the assessment of the state/party-based model, a 
pessimist forecast for the Russian opposition emerges from this opposition-based model 
as well. 
CAMPAIGN IDEOLOGY 
Contrasting Navalny’s ideology from Putin’s first requires an understanding of 
the prevailing narratives that have been present during the past eighteen years of Putin’s 
tenure as president and prime minister. Scholar Brian D. Taylor coined the term “the code 
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of Putnism” to describe the combination of worldview, habits, and emotions held by 
Putin and his team that guides policy and decision-making in Russia.118 This code 
emerged around 2003-2004, is not monolithic in that there is room for disagreement 
within the code, and it “has moved in a more closed and restrictive direction.”119 
Conservatism (in contrast to European liberalism), anti-Westernism, and most 
importantly, great power statism in order “to prevent chaos and collapse” are the most 
fundamental ideals to this code.120 Habits or instinctual impulses of the regime that drive 
decision-making are another component to this code and they include the desire to 
establish control, a commitment to order, antipluralism, personal loyalty, and 
hypermasculinity.121 Emotions are also important to this code. Resentment, vulnerability, 
and most importantly respect are the main emotional components of the code and are 
particularly evident when dealing with the West.122 According to Taylor, this code is 
central to the decision-making and policies of Putin.  
Putin’s party, United Russia, has a catch-all electoral strategy, one that retains a 
fuzzy ideological focus in order to appeal to as many voters as possible. Party programs 
and manifestos tend to contain a great deal of rhetoric or valence issues, ones that are 
unlikely to alienate voters. As a result, identifying United Russia’s collective or solidarity 
benefits is a much more complicated task than for the corresponding particularistic or 
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selective benefits.123 Despite Putin’s initial declaration that he was “against the 
restoration of an official state ideology in any form,” members of his regime sought to 
define an ideology and identity that could move forward and remain relevant to the 
Russian population.124 Vladislav Surkov, the political engineer who has cultivated the 
current Russian political structure as well as Putin’s image, recognized that “a 
bureaucratic way of keeping the country together cannot last, and we will be unable to 
maintain the country’s integrity without complementing this vertical power with an 
‘ideology’ recognized by people.”125 Additionally, he is on the record as saying that the 
greatest flaw in the Russian political system is its reliance on the resources of one person 
(Putin) and, consequently, its reliance on one party.126 
The emergence of “Putinism” is inexplicably tied to a single man. Because it is 
not a coherent ideology that has shifted over time, a collection of buzzwords has been 
used by the regime that reflect the ideals, habits and emotions of the code. “Traditional 
values” and Russian “national and spiritual identity” have elicited aspects of the tsarist 
era, the Soviet era, and the post-Soviet era. Similarly, terms like “sovereign democracy” 
and “authoritarian modernization” emerged as responses to immediate threats and are 
merely small parts of the larger code guiding Putin and his inner circle. This lack of fixed 
ideology in favor of these ideas behind the code of Putinism becomes more apparent 
during his presidential campaigns. United Russia’s electoral program for the 2012 
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presidential election was published on February 8, 2012 in Rossiyskaya Gazeta less than 
one month before the March 4 election. The first section, entitled “Our Values: 
Spirituality of the Russian People,” immediately proclaims: “For the new challenges of 
our time, only a morally healthy society can give a true answer.”127 Putin did not 
campaign directly and in February 2012, he held his only public rally in Luzhniki on the 
old Red Army holiday, now rebranded as the Defenders of the Fatherland Day.128 During 
this rally he urged citizens “not to look overseas, not to run to the left or to the side, and 
not to betray your homeland, but to be with us, work for Russia and love her as we 
do.”129 On December 6, 2017, Putin formally announced his candidacy at a car factory in 
Nizhny Novgorod with the proclamation, “There is no better space and no better occasion 
to announce this. I will run for the presidency of the Russian Federation.”130 Yet, at the 
time of his announcement there was no published platform for Putin’s reelection 
campaign. 
Navalny is acutely aware of this relative lack of ideology and how this code is 
used by the Kremlin. Regarding the political buzzwords, Navalny states, “I don’t 
understand what Putin’s ideology of a “special Russian path” actually means. What does 
“sovereign democracy” mean? There’s no positive ideology there. It’s just another 
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mythologem that’s being imposed on society. When we start asking what exactly this 
“special path” actually entails in practice, they’ve no answer to give us.”131 In relation to 
Putin’s patchwork of past Russian ideologemes, Navalny states, “Putin’s ideology is 
strikingly eclectic: it encompasses everything from Stalin to the church.”132 With the 
“great power” ideas of the past to draw from, “Putin is now skillfully exploiting this 
nostalgia, and his ideology has no other meaning than that.”133 
In April 2015 during an interview in which he elaborated upon the future of 
Russia and his role in its development, Navalny not only stripped down “Putinism”, but 
also provided his own ideas of what sort of ideology he subscribed to and how it could 
benefit the country. In order to garner support from the conservative aspects of society 
that Putin appeals to as well as to promote a more pro-democratic type of governing 
system, Navalny describes “a civic nationalism predicated not on psychology or a sense 
of national superiority, but on universal civil rights and freedoms, and the potential to 
determine the fate of our country together.”134 A year prior, Navalny’s Party of Progress 
platform states in its introduction, “Archaic, corrupt, and unaccountable to citizens, the 
state has long been inconsistent with the level of development of Russian society. Our 
country deserves a modern state, with welfare and the rights of citizens as its cornerstone, 
and not abstract "state" interests.”135 
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During his presidential campaign, the two sources for Navalny’s policy 
recommendations and political platform were his anti-corruption blog and his campaign 
website. The “We Are Often Asked” section of his blog elaborates upon twenty-eight 
frequently asked questions on matters concerning the state, economy and society. This 
question and answer section of Navalny’s blog provided more information on policy than 
the official websites of the Kremlin and Vladimir Putin’s personal website, both of which 
merely state the constitutional roles of the presidency, post photo albums, and report 
recent news of their activities.136,137 The questions address, among other things: the 
structure of the government, the Northern Caucuses, Crimea, foreign policy, the military, 
law enforcement and the judiciary, the economy, infrastructure, and corruption. The 
section on foreign policy offers a clear ideological view of Navalny’s Russia when he 
states: “In relations with the countries of the near abroad, Russia must support those 
principles that it considers to be right for itself: democratic political system, civil liberties 
and human rights, openness of the economy and foreign trade.”138 On his official 
campaign website, these points were more specifically addressed in relation to the 
contemporary situation in Russia.  
                                                                                                                                            
https://partyprogress.org/media/pdf/%D0%9F%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B3%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%BC
%D0%BC%D0%B0_1.pdf. 
136 Президент России (The President of Russia). “Официальные сетевые ресурсы Президента 
России (Official Internet Resources of the President of Russia),” http://kremlin.ru/. 
137 Президент Владидмир Путин (President Vladimir Putin). “Личный сайт (Personal Site),” 
http://putin.kremlin.ru/. 
138 Алексей Навальный (Alexei Navalny). “Нас часто спрашивают: (We Are Often Asked:),” 
Блог Алексея Навального (Blog of Alexei Navalny), https://navalny.com/issues/. 
 
 62 
There are six basic points to Navalny’s election program which are discussed: the 
economy, corruption, infrastructure, devolution of power away from Moscow to the 
regions, foreign policy based on economic development and a migrant policy, and reform 
of the judicial system. Each subject section on his website began with Navalny’s 
campaign slogan, “It’s time to choose,” then he posited criticisms of the current state of 
each area against his proposed solutions and ultimately closed out his points with a 
paragraph stating why and how he was qualified to properly handle these issues.139 Overt 
tones of economic, political, and judicial equality resonated throughout his entire 
platform. A message in the economic section embodies his overall appeal to voters when 
he states that he will pursue policies “in the interests of Russian citizens, not government 
officials, oligarchs or security officials,” that will provide a basic standard for the quality 
of life for all citizens.140 
 When applying Howard, Roessler, and Wahman’s conclusions about the 
importance of ideology for the regime and opposition, Navalny’s ideology in relation to 
that of the ruling party and Putin fits their framework in which an opposition figure with 
a more defined ideology has the opportunity to create tangible movement forward against 
a regime with an unclear guiding ideology. Navalny offered clear ideas to rally behind 
and support with the current problems and proposed solutions plainly stated. Unlike 
Putin, he did not harken back to the past or attempt to elicit support through ideas of state 
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power. Rather, Navalny attempted to gain support by looking forward while considering 
the ills of the past in order to improve the future for Russia.  
OPPOSITION COHESION 
Russian opposition is a broad term that encompasses many ideas, people, and 
tactics. To appreciate the state of affairs during the 2018 campaign, the many groups that 
compose the opposition have to be considered. Additionally, the history of relations 
between these groups plays a factor in the present conditions as well as the developments 
in the future. During the campaign and in the year after the election, the prospects for a 
cohesive coalition of the opposition have not been promising. There is a common person 
to defeat in President Putin, but disagreements about politics, leadership, and the future of 
Russia created roadblocks against the opposition in an environment in which the regime 
had already levied numerous repressive measures. 
The systemic opposition in Russia consists of parties and individuals who have 
formal representation in the Federal Assembly. These parties such as the Communist 
Party of the Russian Federation and the far-right Liberal Democratic Party of Russia are 
merely considered opposition in that they run against Vladimir Putin and the party of 
power, United Russia. The non-systemic opposition is the main area of concern for this 
paper. Members of the non-systemic opposition operate outside of the political 
establishment and are often more reform-minded and openly Western-oriented in their 
political views. At the time of the 2018 campaign, members of the non-systemic 
opposition included, but were not limited to: Mikhail Kasyanov and his People’s 
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Freedom Party (PARNAS), Alexei Navalny and his Party of Progress, Grigori Yavlinsky 
and his Yabloko party, the far-left Sergei Udaltsov and his Left Front movement, and 
Kseniya Sobchak as an independent candidate in the presidential election.  
Developments prior to the 2016 Russian legislative election altered the opposition 
and set the stage for the current divide amongst these leaders. The Democratic Coalition 
was a collaboration between PARNAS, the Party of Progress, the Libertarian Party, the 
Democratic Choice Party and the 5th of December Party. This coalition was created with 
the Duma election in mind so Russia's non-systemic opposition could offer voters a 
single list of parliamentary candidates that would be chosen through a primary system.141 
Everything fell apart when the pro-Kremlin network NTV aired a film about Mikhail 
Kasyanov and PARNAS member Natalia Pelevina that “contained footage of an intimate 
nature, filmed by hidden camera.”142 Navalny and fellow opposition figure Ilya Yashin 
called for Kasyanov to step down and effectively remove himself from the party list. 
Kasyanov refused which led to Yashin and Navalny withdrawing support for the primary 
while also convincing other parties to do the same which led to the end of the short-lived 
Democratic Coalition.143 
 As this took place in May 2016, there was disappointment with the collapse of 
the coalition, but hope that with presidential elections still two years in the future, 
coalition building would still be possible. Navalny emerged as a strong, determined 
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figure in the affair and there was hope that he would run alongside Yabloko and bring his 
more widespread appeal to a party whose electoral successes had recently waned.144 A 
year and a half after the end of the Democratic Coalition, these divisions remained in 
place and only further solidified.  
The non-systemic opposition did not unite as a whole behind any single candidate 
and in addition to refusing to support the candidacy of Navalny, two prominent figures 
within the Russian opposition, Yavlinsky and Sobchak, ran against him. On November 1, 
2017 Yavlinsky launched his campaign website and is running as the founder of Yabloko. 
Sobchak similarly announced her bid for the presidency in mid-October 2017. The 
daughter of Putin’s former boss and mentor Anatoli Sobchak, she was a well-known 
figure in Russia, both as a socialite and more recently as an opposition voice. Navalny 
was quick to point out the differences between his campaign and Sobchak’s initial 
rhetoric. During her first press conference following her candidacy, Sobchak admitted 
she did not want to insult a man who “saved” her father’s life; however, as she is running 
as an opposition figure, Navalny stated that he could not understand her desire to not 
offend Putin.145 Playing into Navalny’s suspicion of Sobchak as an intentionally placed 
candidate meant to dilute the opposition, she was given a slot on the immensely popular 
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state-run debate show Evening With Vladimir Solovyov in order for the Kremlin to “listen 
to the protest agenda” that Sobchak was chosen to represent.146   
In addition to Yavlinsky and Sobchak running against him, members of the 
opposition along the political fringes also failed to endorse Navalny, most significantly 
Udaltsov. Recently freed from five years in custody following charges of inciting public 
unrest during the May 2012 Bolotnaya Protests, Udaltsov stated that he would not 
support Navalny in the upcoming election because he was too pro-Western.147 While he 
occupied a far-left political position, Udaltsov was a valuable mobilizer and protest 
leader; it was him alongside Boris Nemtsov and Navalny who helped spark the massive 
Bolotnaya Protests. Not only did he not support Navalny, but he additionally planned to 
revive his Left Front movement and begin new protests outside of the realm of support 
for Navalny and other aspects of the more moderate opposition.  
As these numerous candidates emerged and the possibility of achieving a 
cohesive opposition coalition became more difficult to envision, the need for such a 
coalition was an idea still being discussed as a necessity. Udaltsov stated that leftist 
opposition groups should propose a single candidate.148 Kasyanov also made a plea for 
unity in a November 13, 2017 blog post. He stated that it is the duty of the democratic 
opposition to participate in the election, but that this participation will only be effective if 
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the democrats join together in a coalition to include Navalny, Yavlinsky, and Sobchak.149 
Howard and Roessler’s work highlighting the necessity of opposition coalitions for 
successful opposition outcomes is on display in Kasyanov’s bid to unite the current 
opposition candidates. Ultimately, no opposition coalition emerged. There was no unified 
voice backing a single opposition candidate and the presence of Yavlinsky, Navalny, and 
Sobchak split any votes the opposition received in an election against the much more 
popular and familiar figure of Vladimir Putin. 
PUBLIC CONCERNS AND CAMPAIGN PLATFORM 
An important aspect of any presidential run is appealing to the concerns and 
desires of the public. In order to assess the relevance of Navalny’s campaign platform to 
the voters, the general ideas that resonate with the public need to be known. Public 
opinion surveys provide a starting point for this comparison. The Levada Center is the 
only independent non-governmental research organization in Russia that conducts 
sociological research on all aspects of society. When conducting and publishing their 
findings, they follow the principles of the World Association for Public Opinion 
Research and the European Society for Opinion and Marketing Research. They are 
regarded as an accurate and unbiased alternative to government run polling centers to the 
point of being deemed a “foreign agent” in 2016 following a survey that showed a drop in 
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the popularity of United Russia leading up to the parliamentary elections.150 In the 
remaining sections, all polling information was taken from Levada surveys conducted 
from 2016-2017. The percentages ascribed to each response is the percentage of 
respondents out of the whole who chose that particular answer. 
Before addressing Navalny, the attitudes toward civil society are pertinent to 
explain. A February 2016 survey was centered entirely on this topic. The question of 
whether Russia has a civil society shows a murky understanding on behalf of respondents 
with the strongest results of “probably yes” only yielding a 37% response rate. 
Responding to whether Russia needs a civil society, 49% responded affirmatively, though 
only 19% stated “definitely yes” with the remaining 30% stating “probably yes.” The 
main reasons for maintaining civil society among its supporters were to keep power 
under control (41%), to give society a choice between government and opposition 
platforms (29%), and to foster dialog between the government and the people (28%).151 
These findings show only a small portion of society has knowledge of current civil 
society affairs and slightly less than half of respondents deem its mere existence as 
important in the Russian context.  
Two Levada surveys relating to public concerns were conducted in August and 
October 2017. The August survey asked respondents to identify the most alarming and 
most pressing problems pressing society while the October survey sought to understand 
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the top fears of respondents. Children or loved ones falling ill (47%), war (37%), illness 
or losing the ability to work (32%), and poverty (22%) were the top four responses.152 
These represent the everyday examples of policy decisions made at the government level 
as experienced at the level of the individual citizen. At the macro level, the causes of 
these effects are embodied in the responses to the most pressing issues facing Russia. 
Economic issues dominated the top concerns: price increases (61%), 
poverty/impoverishment of most of the population (45%), increase in unemployment 
(33%), corruption/bribery (33%).153 Comparing these answers to Navalny’s platform 
shows some area of mutual concern and other areas where his platform touches on 
problems that are not deemed as important by large portions of society. 
The first section of Navalny’s platform addressed aspects of the economy ranging 
from taxation of the wealthy to the reduction of housing prices. He sought welfare for all 
in order to help aid economic growth, his plans for a tax exemption for small businesses 
is meant to spur growth, and his desire to instate a higher minimum wage and minimum 
pension fit well in line with the economic concerns expressed by the respondents.154 An 
overall hostile tone toward oligarchs was part of his pledge to reverse income inequality 
and further in line with a greater desire to improve the economy. It is this area where 
societal concerns and Navalny’s platform have the most overlap. The remainder of his 
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platform began to stray from this more solid cornerstone that underpins both public fears 
and their concerns for problems facing society. 
Campaign issues and percentage of public concern can be overlaid to display this 
decrease in relevance. Corruption (33%), healthcare (26%), education (13%), and judicial 
reform (8%) round out several other pillars of Navalny’s platform yet they are areas 
where, at most, a little over a quarter of respondents deemed as the most alarming 
societal problems.155 The issues of “limited civil rights and democratic freedoms 
(freedom of speech, freedom of press)” only received a 4% response rate and has never 
risen above this level in the sixteen years Levada has asked it in this particular survey.156 
Although Navalny’s emphasis on the economy was similarly an area of societal 
concern, the relevance of his other policies in relation to what society wants solved or 
addressed can be called into question. There may have been a strong connection 
regarding this emphasis on the economy, but Navalny often framed these problems as all 
resulting from corruption which, while still a concern, was often used to further a larger 
anti-regime, pro-democratic agenda which was not as highly valued by these respondents 
in relation to other problems.  
CAMPAIGN ENGAGEMENT WITH SOCIETY 
While Navalny’s ideas of the most urgent areas of concern for Russian may not 
have exactly met those of most citizens, his attempts at widening his audience were 
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largely successful and his ability to disseminate his message under conditions of 
oppression was one of his strong suits. At the time, TV Rain was the only independent 
television station in Russia and it along with the several independent newspapers such as 
Novaya Gazeta operated under tedious conditions in which the threat of shutdowns, 
financial extortion, and physical harm are a part of their everyday existence. It is only 
through these media outlets that Navalny was able to reach the public through traditional 
means of politician-to-citizen communication. Every other state-owned news outlet either 
simply ignored Navalny’s campaign for the majority of time or would only portray it as a 
negative symbol of Western incursion in Russia. Thus, by understanding his limitations, 
he adapted and sought to expand his presence into one area that has not yet been 
completely overtaken by the Kremlin and its influence, the internet.  
Navalny’s blog began as an anti-corruption blog that exposed the illegal dealings 
of Putin and the elites around him, but as his campaign progressed it also become a stage 
for his campaign as well. Directly on the top of the home page were links to two separate 
Navalny RSS feeds and his profiles on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, VK, Odnoclassiki, 
and YouTube. Similarly, each social media profile links to the other and his posts were 
shared across platforms to reach as many users as possible. During the fall of 2017 in the 
few months prior to the 2018 election, his YouTube page had 1.5 million subscribers and 
his videos which usually are posted a rate of one per week are routinely viewed over one 
million times. On Twitter, his 2.18 million followers far exceeded any other Russian 
political figure as well as the official pages of the Kremlin, Russian government, and 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Instead of attempting to gain coverage in state-run media, 
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Navalny created an alternative environment for his message that is not limited to just the 
small scope of the Russian independent media. With his wide online presence, the entire 
campaign of this opposition figure could be seen throughout Russia and the world.  
In Russia, 20-25% of the adult population watches video bloggers and this 
number rises to 50% of those between the ages 18 to 24.157 As one of the most popular 
videobloggers in Russia, he had the opportunity to discuss his political agenda on other 
popular blogs that are usually reserved for entertainment purposes. The ability to reach 
beyond his opposition protestor base was entirely a result of his social media presence. 
Young people in particular were engaged on an entirely different level than previous 
opposition leaders or the Kremlin had been able to achieve.  
At 41 years old, Navalny was a fresh face contrasted against the Kremlin 
establishment and the elder opposition leaders like Yavlinsky and Kasyanov. During his 
speeches, Navalny constantly emphasized a very simple message: lying, stealing, 
corruption, bribery and hypocrisy are bad.158 Easy to grasp concepts that related to right 
and wrong were intended to be more accessible to larger parts of the population. For 
more Western-leaning youth, Navalny’s social media presence, age, and rhetoric of 
simplification were appealing and helped to mobilize supporters. 
In addition to gaining subscribers and online followers, Navalny’s presidential 
campaign placed a heavy emphasis on physical appearances and rallies across Russia. 
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Initially adept at organizing anti-corruption marches and rallying alongside liberal 
opposition members in Moscow and St. Petersburg, Navalny applied his past experiences 
to his campaign. Campaigning meant extensively traveling around Russia while using 
social media and his array of offices staffed with volunteers to organize “meetings” with 
citizens everywhere. His blog had a schedule of upcoming appearances with location, 
date, and time listed, similar to a band touring a country. Within the first two weeks of 
December 2017, he had travelled and held rallies in six separate cities. With no party 
apparatus or establishment backing, these travels were funded and organized through 
donations and his support network of volunteers. According to his campaign website, 
189,852 people volunteered for the campaign and 83 offices were established throughout 
the country.159  
Navalny’s extensive use of social media and Western style campaigning were 
indispensably valuable to his campaign strategy. He subverted the Kremlin-led 
oppression and managed to work over the system that was meant to stifle him. Arising 
out of necessity, the innovative political and media strategy of Navalny allowed for his 
message to reach a larger audience and engaged the Russian population unlike any 
previous candidate or political figure in the country. With this mobilization strategy in 
mind, the final section of this section discusses the perceptions of his campaign by 
society. 
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SOCIETAL PERCEPTIONS OF CAMPAIGN LEGITIMACY 
When any election day arrives, the support of the public is essential for success. 
An electoral loss with high turnout and vote-share my not result in attaining the sought-
after office, but lessons are learned for future campaigns and areas of success can be 
weighed against areas that need improvement in order to produce a better result during 
the next campaign. Navalny’s 2013 mayoral run resulted in a loss, but he set a precedent 
by obtaining an unexpectedly high number of votes, thereby showing that an opposition 
figure could rally a major city and potentially win the race in the future. Survey polls that 
account for societal perceptions and preferences of the 2018 presidential election yielded 
a more grim picture for Navalny’s campaign and the future potential of success for his 
campaigns at the national level.  
In a survey that was conducted across 137 Russian cities during February 2017, 
only 47% of respondents knew who Navalny was compared to 53% who did not. This 
was the lowest level of name recognition since January 2014. Among those who 
recognized him, 35% were indifferent toward him and 23% “had nothing good to say 
about him.” Similarly, among those who knew of him, a strong 63% responded that they 
would “definitely not” vote for him while only 10% of this group stated that they may 
possibly vote for him.160 A June 2017 survey shows an increase in recognition to 55% of 
respondents. Recognition was highest among wealthier and more educated citizens. 
Moscow also displayed the highest level of recognition with 88% affirming their 
knowledge of the protest leader, blogger, and former mayoral candidate. The same survey 
                                               
160 The Levada Center. “Aleksey Navalny,” 03/20/2017, 
https://www.levada.ru/en/2017/03/20/aleksey-navalny/. 
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also enquired into Navalny’s political motivations. 30% of respondents said the he acts in 
the interest in West, 28% for the interest of furthering his campaign and only 12% for the 
interest of Russia. Again, this split in perception was attributable to the demographics of 
respondents. The opinion that he acts in the interests of the West was supported primarily 
by respondents over 40 years old. Young people and Muscovites often showed a positive 
opinion, that he acts in the interests of Russia.161 
Lastly, moving beyond name recognition, surveys conducted in late 2017 
assessing the attitudes of the population to the presidential candidates did not bode well 
for Navalny or any opposition figures. Conducted in late October 2017, when asked 
which candidate respondents would vote for if the election were the upcoming Sunday, 
Navalny lands in third place with the support of 1.8% of respondents. For comparison, 
LDPR leader Zhirinovsky, a conspiratorial and radical mainstay of Russian politics since 
the collapse of the Soviet Union received 3% support.162 A slight majority of the 
population knew about Navalny, but within that portion of society, a much smaller 
number trusted his intentions and said they would support him in the 2018 Russian 
presidential election.  
Of the benchmarks for electoral success in the opposition-based model, only the 
existence of a distinct ideology is definitively met. There is little cohesion within the 
opposition and regardless of innovative methods of engagement with society, Navalny’s 
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policies did not adequately address the concerns of voter, nor was his campaign itself 
seen as legitimate or ultimately beneficial for Russia.  
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Chapter 6. Conclusion and Implications 
This paper set out to better understand the electoral viability of the contemporary 
Russian political opposition by framing this Russian case against the backdrop of 
scholarship on successful opposition movements in competitive authoritarian regimes. 
From this existing research, two models emerged for analyzing potential opposition 
success in these regime types: the state/party-based model and the opposition-based 
model. In the state/party-based model, opposition electoral success is dependent on the 
structural factors of the state, including linkages with Western democracies, leverage of 
these democracies over the competitive authoritarian regime, and the state/party 
organizational capacity. Opposition movements were most successful in countries with 
greater linkages and leverage along with lower state organizational capacity while 
incumbent regimes more often than not retained power when linkages and leverage were 
low and organizational capacity was high. The opposition-based model places the 
possibility for opposition success not in the structural elements of the state and political 
system, but within the characteristics of the opposition itself. A distinct ideology in 
contrast to the ruling regime, cohesion of the opposition movement, public perception 
and approval of the opposition and their policies, in addition to competency of opposition 
engagement with society are the markers of success in the opposition-based model.  
After applying each of these models to Russia, both yield the same result: the 
likelihood of a Russian opposition electoral victory is very low under current conditions. 
For the state/party-based model, the linkages, leverages, and state/party organizational 
capacity were discussed chronologically from the 1990s onward to the present day. Low 
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levels of linkages and leverage with Western democracies was a holdover from the Soviet 
era and these levels only decreased during the Putin era, especially from his third 
presidential term onward. The 2000s were also a period during which the organization 
capacity of the state and party of power was increased to a level of nearly unhindered 
legislative and judicial control complimented by the simultaneous use of the security 
apparatus to extend state control. According to the research behind the state/party-based 
model, in instances of low leverage, low linkage, and high state/party organization 
capacity, the incumbent regime universally remained in power and was unchallenged by 
the opposition. Considering the standards of the opposition-based model, the only 
benchmark met by opposition during Navalny’s 2018 campaign was the existence of an 
ideology distinct from and posed against that of the incumbent regime. The utilization of 
social media was an innovate strategy for engagement with society; however, the policies 
of the campaign did not correspond with the concerns of the public and public perception 
of the campaign was universally very negative. 
These models are important because they provide comprehensive explanations 
and a nuanced approach to the complicated dynamic between a political opposition 
movement and a competitive authoritarian regime. In the course of this research, I have 
considered several questions regarding the models themselves. Is it the fault of Navalny’s 
campaign and the opposition as a whole that they do not meet the criteria for success of 
the opposition-based model? Can these benchmarks be met in the Russian context? 
Thinking in terms of these models themselves, should one of these be prioritized over the 
other as a more accurate descriptor of the mechanism for success in these difficult 
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environments? In this case of studying Navalny’s campaign and assessing the opposition-
based model, it is important to consider the Russian political environment as described in 
the context of the state/party-based model. Based on this study, the ability for the 
opposition to reach the opposition-based benchmarks of success was largely dictated by 
the factors described in the state/party-based model. As a result of low Western linkages 
and leverage, the Russian opposition was forced to be self-sustaining and contended with 
the obstacles of a competitive authoritarian environment without the potential for 
impactful foreign advocacy or aid. What limited agency they did have was further limited 
by the state and ruling party’s high organizational capacity which leveled electoral laws, 
utilized the state security apparatus, and reframed political opposition as a pro-Western, 
anti-Russian entity intent on destabilizing Russia.  To use Levitsky and Way’s 
terminology, not only was the playing field uneven, but the parameters of the field and 
rules of the game were set by the state.  
Thus, it seems that the state/party-based model proposed by Levitsky and Way is 
the more appropriate of these two models gauging the potential for political opposition 
electoral success in competitive authoritarian regimes. This model provides a better 
understanding of the dynamic between the opposition and the incumbent leadership. By 
using this model, the observer is able to better understand how and why certain actions 
and characteristics of the opposition are manifested. Rather than simply pointing to a 
single factor such as the lack of opposition cohesion as a reason for why political 
opposition is not electorally successful, the state/party model delves into the greater 
structures that are responsible for these opposition failures and successes.  
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Linkages and resultant leverage take time to establish; however, as was shown in 
the Russian case, they can be done away with relatively quickly, especially when levels 
of each were low to begin with and when competitive authoritarian regime in question 
has strong regional influence in addition to significant military capabilities. Putin was 
able to further reduce existing linkages with relative ease through aggressive actions that 
violated international norms. Additionally, the organizational power of the state and 
ruling party was greatly increased by the time Putin’s second term had ended.  
Where does the Russian opposition go from this point? Though there are several 
existing explanations, this area is in need of future research. Once in control of the 
legislative, judicial and security apparatus, how is state and party organizational 
capacity? In general, how are the trajectories of components essential to the state/party-
based model reversed? Levitsky and Way briefly mention the potentially destabilizing 
effects of a sudden economic shock in a regime without a distinct guiding ideology. The 
reasoning is as follows: Without a single unifying ideology to rally behind, elites would 
defect from the party of power as societal unrest would target this party that they believed 
to no longer be capable of providing them with economic security and stability. With 
elite defection comes the lowering of state and party organizational capacity which in 
turn opens up more space for opposition politicians in the political arena. Brian D. Taylor 
points out an inherent area of weakness of the Russian governing system that has 
emerged as Russia has become less democratic. He states that “because the formal 
[governing] institutions are to a significant degree fictitious, political and economic elites 
have to rely more than ever on informal networks to pursue their objectives and get 
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things done.”163 These informal networks compete with one another outside of the 
institutional setting while still being forced to formally gesture within these institutional 
facades. This competition and dual nature of the political environment within the 
government lead to ineffective governance. When considered in relation to Levitsky and 
Way’s loophole, the prospect of elite defection and a decrease in state organizational 
capacity in times of crisis seems more likely due the fact there is already competition 
within the Putin regime for influence and status. 
While these areas remain deserving of future research, the existing literature on 
competitive authoritarian regimes is already quite extensive. From this field, these two 
models for assessing the viability of opposition electoral success have emerged. This 
paper contributes to this body of work by utilizing these existing models to provide both 
a contemporary view of the political environment surrounding the Russian opposition as 
well as a substantive ruling on the prospects of opposition electoral success. Though both 
models predict the same negative outcome and despite the various barriers imposed on 
them, the opposition and remnants of non-state civil society continue to campaign and 
protest. Citizens have not stopped supporting the causes of the opposition or its key 
figures who still receive international media coverage for their efforts. It is important to 
remember these facts in the face the daunting realities of the current Russian political 
system and the bleak forecast for the immediate future. Regardless of model applied or 
academic assessment leveled, efforts to counter the Putin regime occur every day. The 
will of the Russian opposition has not been extinguished. 
163 Taylor, 5.
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